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1CHAPTER 1 AN OVERVIEWOF THE FORWARD PREMIUMPUZZLE, AN-
IMAL SPIRITS, AND EVERYTHING IN BETWEEN
1 Introduction
There lies a long tradition in analyzing the relationship between two countrys spot
and forward exchange rates. Early empirical works such as Hansen and Hodrick (1980)
and Bilson (1981) utilize the forward exchange rate as a predictor for future spot exchange
rates, establishing the consensus that the former is a poor indicator of future movements
of the latter. Other early important works like Frankel (1982), Hsieh (1982), Hodrick and
Srivastave (1984) focus on the question of whether forward exchange rates explained variation
contained within premiums. However, it wasnt until Fama (1984) testing the variational
relationship between the forward exchange rate premium and expected future spot exchange
rate elements of forward exchange rates that the conanical form of the eld began to take
shape. In his paper, Fama discovers that conditional on the hypothesis that markets are
rational and e¢ cient most of the variation in forward exchange rates is related to variation
in premiums, and more importantly, that the premium and expected future spot exchange
rates are negatively correlated. It is from this last nding that the term forward premium
puzzlewas introduced and, according to Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), has established itself
as one of the great international macroeconomic anomalies.
A more formal interpretation of this anomaly begins with a simple empirical framework
of the forward exchange rate and its relationship with the spot exchange rate or,
2St+1 = 0 + 1Ft + "t+1 (1)
where in (1) St+1 is the expected future spot exchange rate, Ft = ln(ft) is the log of the
forward exchange rate, and "t+1 is an i.i.d, normally distributed error term. The fundamental
null hypothesis is to test 1 = 1 where 0 can be equated to any constant. Since it is assumed
that 1 = 1 , the log of the current spot exchange rate, or St = ln(st) , is subtracted from
both sides of (1) yielding,
St+1   St = 0 + 1 (Ft   St) + "t+1 (2)
where (2) describes Ft St as the forward premium which explains variation in the gross
rate of depreciation (ex-post) or St+1   St. Equation (2) is the form essentially estimated
by Fama (1984) where not only is 1di¤erent than unity, it is found to be negative, hence
the advent of the forward premium puzzle as seen through lense of this short formal walk-
through. The anomaly is connected to a failure in the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP)
by rst establishing covered interest rate parity or,
(Ft   St) = (Rt  Rt ) (3)
so that Rt is the return yielded to investors from domestic bonds and Rt is the return
yielded to investors from foreign bonds so that excess returns from (Rt  Rt ) is in equilibrium
with the forward exchange rate premium (Ft   St), which is the denition of covered interest
3parity. Now, inserting (3) into (2) for (Ft   St) results in,
St+1   St = 0 + 1 (Rt  Rt ) + "t+1 (4)
hence (4) establishes the denition of UIP, which states excess returns are in equilibrium
with the change in gross rate of depreciation, or St+1   St = (Rt  Rt ) which occurs if
0 = 0 and 1 = 1. Of course, (4) cannot be directly estimated and the closest proxy is (2),
however using the discovery of 1 < 0 from (2) and applying it to (4) results in 1 6= 1so
that St+1   St 6= (Rt  Rt ) which is a violation in the denition of, and failure in, the UIP.
In a survey by Froot and Thaler (1990), the average estimate of 1over 75 publications is
-0.88, and as stated by Engle (1996), only a few of the estimates is greater than 0, and
none is greater than 1 (p.125).The breakdown in UIP, despite the validity of uid markets
under covered interest rate parity, could occur for a variety of reasons but the predominant
scenarios as stated by Chinn (2007) are 1. Rational Expectations is an invalid assumption;
2. Risk Premium exists as an unseencomponent embedded within the forward premium
estimator, 1; and 3. Econometric Implementation.
From this point, the chapter is broken into sections that focus on major areas of research
contributing to the solution of the forward premium puzzle namely Section 2 discusses works
pertaining to the weakness of expectation formation within Rational Expectations, Section 3
encompasses articles focused on Risk Premium as a potential solution to the anomaly, Section
4 argues multiple econometric techniques that could be causing the forward premium puzzle,
Section 5 introduces literature pertaining to Robust Control and its implementation within
4Rational Expectations framework, resulting in Animal Spirits as being a candidate to
solving the forward premium puzzle, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Rational Expectations
The hallmark of macroeconomic modeling, originally proposed by Muth (1961), Rational
Expectations (RE) essentially has economic agents form expectations about future macro-
economic values by utilizing all information within a given time period, so that systematic
bias is theoretically non-existent and all errors are strictly random. This feature of expecta-
tion formation has led to RE monumental success but also to its most signicant weakness,
which is especially prevalent within the context of forward premium puzzle literature. En-
gle (1996) and more recently Sarno (2005) both give an exhaustive survey of the state of
forward premium literature within the context of RE (as well as within the realm of risk
premium literature), however here important contributions are highlighted and focus on solv-
ing the anomaly by exploiting weaknesses within RE and develop alternative structures to
households forming expectations.
Early notable works include Froot and Frankel (1989) which decompose a RE model into
two sets of agents where the rst set formulates expectations based on time-series data and
the second set based on survey-data. The authors nd that measures of (St+1   St) di¤er
greatly under each data set so that a survey-based data regime contributes to a greater
forward premium bias than the time-series-based data regime suggesting the types of in-
formation agents utilize to formulate expectations causes the anomaly as opposed to the
5mechanic of expectation formulation itself. An alternative annex to the denition of RE
described above is that expectations formulated by economic agents are correct over time on
average, with no systematic bias so that agents are essentially learning from random pertur-
bations, revising future forecasts of macroeconomic variables. In other words, as stated by
Chinn (2007), it may not be that households are simply irrational, on the contrary economic
agents are constantly learning so that forecasts may be embedded with long-run biases which
contribute to the forward premium anomaly. Cheung (1993) incorporate a learning feature
within economic agents through Kalman ltering to account for bias within forecasts. Che-
ung uses data in monthly frequency from July 1973 to December 1987 for the pound, the
mark, and the yen. In his work, (Ft   St) follows a low order ARMA process and ultimately
exhibits a large amount of persistence, is negatively correlated with (St   Et 1 (St)), and
very volatile emulating key features of the data.
A major weakness in RE is that agents are believed to have full information processing
capabilities. In reality, this is hardly the case as there are a wide number of media out-
lets and information sources that the modern-day consumer cannot fully take into account
when making economic decisions. To bring models closer to reality, Sims (2003) introduced
Rational Inattention (RI) within macroeconomic modeling framework via Linear-Quadratic
Control (LQC) techniques. Essentially, RI imposes a cost to the consumer for processing
data so that a limited amount of information through a channel-capacity (measured in
bytes per time unitor bpt). The wider the channel-capacity, the more households are
able to process information and vice versa. Applied to the forward premium puzzle frame-
6work, although explained without formal models, Froot and Thaler (1990) and Lyons (2001)
describe the ability of the anomaly to be solved by explaining economic agentssluggishness
in responding to new information. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) formally apply RI to a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model and discover that agents with low
costs to processing information trade assets more actively, while other agents do no trade
actively so only a small number of investors are attentive to new information. By imposing
this restriction the authors, among many discoveries, nd that inattention can account for
most of the observed predictability of excess returns in the foreign exchange market, directly
leading to a solution in the forward premium puzzle1.
In macroeconomic models built on RE hypothesis, economic agents operate with no sys-
tematic bias, meaning forecasts about future macroeconomic variables are made with no
systematic error. To state that households have a deep enough understanding about the
evolutionary process of the economy is farfetched, prompting Gourchinas and Tornell (2004)
to incorprate systematic distortions in investorsbeliefs about interest rate processes, ren-
dering economic agents irrational where agents believe shocks to the economic enviornment
are excessively transitory contrary to the shocks actual duration. In their paper, using sur-
vey data from G-7 countries the authors account for a negative forward premium estimator
and exchange rate overshooting, which may or may not occur given their model structure.
Another interesting branch of literature related to implementing systematic error within
macroeconomic models are works concerning sentiment-based explanations to the forward
1See Du¢ e and Sun (1990), Lynch (1996), Gabaix and Laibson (2003), and Peng and Xiong (2006) for
more examples of models incorporating costs to information processing.
7premium anomaly.
Yu (2013) describes agents perceiving higher domestic economic growth over foreign
growth as having high sentimentwhich contributes to domestic interest rates exceeding
foreign interest rates causing misperception about interest rate evolution and thus system-
atic bias in the decision of purchasing currency as an asset. Sentiment-based literature
incorporates a behavioral component within economic modeling as economic agents hav-
ing high sentiments is equivalent, according to Yu, as being optimistic. Using a 3-month
forward exchange rate from 1973-2009 for G-10 countries and Baker and Wurglers (2006)
investor sentiment index from July 1965 to December 2007 as a proxy to sentiment elements
mathematically embedded in the model, Yu accounts for the failure in UIP and low correla-
tion between consumption growth di¤erentials and exchange rate changes, a key feature of
international market data2.
As the eld concerning manipulations to RE assumption continues to grow, other re-
searchers prefer to maintain this hypothesis and instead focus on risk aversion manifesting
as a risk-premium,embedded within the forward premium estimator.
3 Risk Premium
A large body of literature focuses on embedding risk-averse agents with a risk-premium
component as a way of solving the forward premium puzzle. The canonical interpretation
of risk premium is that it drives a wedge between actual changes in the spot exchange rate,
2See Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and Xiong and Yan (2010) for further works relating to
sentiment-based modeling.
8(St+1   St), and expected changes in the spot exchange rate, (Et (St+1)  St) 3, where this
discrepancy causes a negative relationship with (Ft   St). As described in Engle (1996), to
model risk premium proves to be complicating but the essential formal components follow
from (2) reproduced here for convenience,
St+1   St = 0 + 1 (Ft   St) + "t+1
where, as stated above, the null hypothesis to be tested is 0 = 0, 1 = 1, and "t+1 
N (0; 2) where 2 is a constant variance term. Simplifying and using statistical operators,
the estimator 1becomes,
plim
c1 = Cov (Ft   St; St+1   St)V ar (Ft   St) (5)
where b1is the estimate of 1and is assumed to be consistent. Now, according to Engle, if
expectations are rational then actual changes in the gross rate of depreciation are equivalent
to expected changes in the gross rate of depreciation systematically speaking, with albeit
random errors or more formally,
St+1   St = Et (St+1)  St + t+1 (6)
where Et is an economic agentsexpectation given all information at time t and t+1 
N (0; 2). Using (6) the covariance term in (5) can be redened as,
3The phrases changes in spot exchange rateand gross rate of depreciationare synonymous.
9Cov (Ft   St; St+1   St) = Cov (Ft   St; Et (St+1)  St) (7)
now, to embed the risk-premium component within the right-hand side of (7) the expected
change in spot exchange rates is altered by a simple manipulation,
Et (St+1)  St = Et (St+1)  St + Ft   Ft
= Ft   St   Ft + Et (St+1)
= Ft   St   rpret (8)
where,
rpret = Ft   Et (St+1) (9)
so that (9) is known as the risk-premium under the assumption of RE. The logic behind
(9) is that if agents are risk neutral, the forward exchange rate Ft would be driven to
equate with the expected future spot exchange rate Et (St+1), basically eliminating the risk-
premium so that rpret = 0. Alternatively, as explained by Engle, if agents are risk-averse
and if Ft > Et (St+1) then the investor requires a premium for purchasing foreign currency
forward at current time period t relative to the exchange-rates expected spot value at future
time period t + 1 so that rpret > 0, basically to compensate the investor for purchasing a
risky asset. Now, inserting (8) into the right-hand side of (7) results in,
10
Cov (Ft   St; Et (St+1)  St) = V ar (Ft   St)  Cov (Ft   St; rpret )
= V ar (Ft   St)  Cov (Et (St+1)  St; rpret )  V ar (rpret )(10)
nally, inserting (10) into the numerator of (5) and simplifying results in,
plim
c1 = 1  rp (11)
where,
rp =
Cov (Et (St+1)  St; rpret ) + V ar (rpret )
V ar (Ft   St) (12)
where the bias term rp from (11) is an indirect function of rp
re
t . A common nding in
earlier works using this methodology, such as Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984), is that b1 < 1
and is not necessarily negative implying that (12) is a small positive when V ar (Ft   St) is
large. Within the context of risk-premium literature, authors have introduced a variety of
methods to ultimately enhance the general form of (11) and emulate the forward premium
puzzle inherent within international data.
Campbell and Chochrane (1999) incorporate habit persistence within an investors utility
function and model consumption as an exogenous process that is used to explain a wealth
of dynamic asset pricing related to international stock markets. Following Campbell and
Chochrane, Verdelhan (2010) develops a model within the realm of RE but induces an
11
external habit preference over consumption in economic agents. The intuition is that assum-
ing Arrow-Debreau markets, the real exchange rate which is measured in terms of domestic
goods relative to foreign goods is equivalent to the ratio of foreign to domestic pricing kernels.
Thus, uctuations in the exchange rate are dependent on the stochastic process underlying
domestic and foreign consumption growth shocks. Furthermore, Verdelhan explains that if
the conditional variance of the domestic stochastic discount factor is large relative to its
foreign counterpart, then domestic growth shocks in consumption determine uctuations in
real exchange rates. Intuitively, if the economy experiences a negative consumption growth
shock, this triggers an exchange rate depreciation which lowers the domestic investors re-
turns on purchased assets. Alternatively, if a positive consumption growth shock occurs, this
causes appreciation in exchange rates translating as a higher return to domestic investors.
Conclusively, investors carrying currencies are exposed to consumption growth risks so that
the investor requires a risk-premium to compensate for such risk, adding a downward bias
to the forward premium estimator4. Aside from models embedding habit persistence, an-
other branch of literature popular within risk-premium modeling is incorporating nominal
rigidities within RE framework.
The introduction of sticky prices within the context of DSGE models and RE induces
risk premia to aid in explaining the forward premium anomaly. Lucas (1982), although no
nominal rigidities are incorporated, pioneered risk premium inclusion within a DSGE , two-
country, two-money model and showed structurally that risk premium drives a wedge between
4See Moore and Roche (2010) for further literature on habit preferences and its relation to forward
premium bias.
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the forward and spot exchange rates. Although a valiant attempt, the implementation of
a risk premium within Lucasmodel failed to account for the forward premium bias unless
an extremely large parameter value of relative risk aversion is calibrated or the correlation
between consumption and exchange rates must be high, as explained by Sarno (2005). In
an open economy DSGE model analogous to Adolfson et al. (2007) that shares features of
benchmark new Keynesian models set forth by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005),
Adolfson et al. (2008) incorporate nominal and real frictions that structurally enhances the
risk premium used to explain failure in UIP. In their work, Adolfson et al. (2008) alter the
structural representation of their open economy model used in Adolfson et al. (2007) and
change the UIP condition to allow for the risk premium to be negatively correlated with
the expected change in spot exchange rates. This type of modication to the UIP condition
introduces a lagged dependence between exchange rates and interest rates in the model, a
relationship otherwise absent under standard UIP framework. Using Swedish from 1980 to
2004, Adolfson et al. (2008) show that their log-linearlized system under the modied UIP
framework matches data better than its unmodied counterpart, that is to say, given the
overall structure of their model, the authors can account for the forward premium anomaly5.
4 Econometric Implementation
Until now, the primary focus has been on structural literature pertaining to exploitation
of weaknesses within and alteration of RE as well as preserving the RE hypothesis and
5See Alvarez et al. (2002) for further interesting forms of rigidities within DSGE framwork.
13
introducing risk premium to explain the forward premium puzzle. Here, attention is shifted to
the noteworthy body of literature dealing with empirical issues behind the forward premium
anomaly. Most of the before mentioned estimation has been done using simple ordinary least
squares (OLS) analysis but such estimations su¤er from omitted variable bias as observed
by Fama (1984) and Liu and Maddala (1992), performing as a catalyst to the structural
discussions above.
An early common belief [see Crowder (1994); Evans and Lewis (1993); and Mark et al.
(1993)], with respect to time-series aspects, was that (Ft   St) exhibited a non-stationary
process leading to inconsistent estimates of 1. According to Crowder (1994), a standard
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is applied to the Canadian, German, and UK to US
exchange rates and it is found that insu¢ cient evidence exists to reject the hypothesis of a
unit root within the forward premium (although this nding was mixed for the UK to US
forward premium). Similarly, Crowder also implements the KPSS6 test for stationarity and
rejects the hypothesis of I (0) (suggesting I (1) behavior) for the list of previously mentioned
forward premiums. The result of both ADF and KPSS tests imply that the forward premium
indeed contains a unit root and is non-stationary.
Baillie and Bollerslev (1994) challenge this notion of non-stationarity and use autoregres-
sive fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) modeling on the forward premium,
and is estimated using approximate maximum-likelihood (MLE) methodology. The reason
for an exotic modeling technique is that Baillie and Bollerslev argue Crowders choice in
6See Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992).
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conducting the KPSS is rather weak, in that the econometrician only has a choice between
selecting an I (0) or I (1) cointegrated process and there may be information missing between
these degrees of cointegration. More general cointegration is allowed, namely the forward
premium is allowed to follow a fractional cointegration process, or I (d) where 0 < d < 1,
and with this identication modeled to an ARFIMA specication the forward premium be-
comes a mean-reverting process where random perturbations eventually die out. Baillie and
Bollerslev also venture to argue that the KPSS test is rather powerful against fractional
integration models so that to reject an I (0) specication should not automatically lead an
econometrician to believe a time series follows an I (1) process, but should consider the im-
plications of an I (d) process as well. In more recent work, Maynard and Phillips (2001)
utilize an ARFIMA specication with approximate MLE estimation for both short-horizon
and long-horizon data and suggest that the forward premium anomaly maybe due to the
discrepancy in persistence between both series. When a series is highly persistent, Maynard
and Phillips argue that assuming 1 = 1 and subtracting St from both sides of (1) to yield (2)
causes severe distortions to the distribution of the forward premium estimator, contributing
to its downward bias.
Another rich area of research is concerned with vector error correction modeling (VECM)
where, depending on the cointegration of St and Ft, the relationship between each series can
be split into short-run adjustment and long-run equilibrium components. A computational
convenience to VECM is that the resulting empirical structure is independent of whether
time-series data is stationary, which has led to its popularity in tting forward premium
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data. The traditional VECM equation is represented as,
4yt =  + yt 1 +
p 1X
i=1
i4yt i + "t (13)
where 4yt = yt  yt 1,  is a constant,  = 0 and is known as an adjustment-matrix
whose value describes the amount of time (depending on a data sets frequency) a variable
takes to reach its long-run equilibrium where  and  are k  r matrices, i is a k  k
coe¢ cient matrix denoting long-run equilibrium values of variables in vector yt i from lag
i = 1; : : : ; p  1 and "t conforms to a vector of gaussian white-noise processes. Sarno (2005)
explains that the spot and forward exchange rates are incorporated into (13) via the vector
yt =
24
St; F
1
t ; F
2
t ; F
3
t ; : : : ; F
l
t
350, where St and Ft are dened as in Section 1and l
is the number of periods a forward exchange rate comes to realization where the elements
of yt must be cointegrated with l unique cointegrating vectors where each of these unique
vectors are given by the row of the matrix
24
; Il
35 where  is an l-dimensional column
vector of ones and Il is an l l identity matrix. Clarida and Taylor (1997) utilize the form of
[eq:13] and apply this modeling technique to weekly data on the dollar/sterling, dollar/mark,
and dollar/yen data discovering that VECM ts the data features quite well. Specically,
dynamic out of sample forecasts up to one year ahead out-perform alternative forecasts
utilizing random-walk and standard forward premium regression techniques. Clarida, Sarno,
Taylor, and Valente (2003) introduce Markov-chain regime switching within a VECM of the
form in (13) to create Markov-switching vector error correction models (MS-VECM) and t
a variety of exchange rates across a range of forward rate time-horizons and discover that,
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in terms of forecasting, the MS-VECM outperforms general VECM, random-walk models,
and standard forward premium regression models7.
Thus far, the discussion has been concerned with literature based on failure in UIP, or the
forward premium puzzle, and its solution via weaknesses in RE, embedding risk-premia, or
econometric implementation. Now, gears are shifted toward a phenomena from the realm of
behavioral macroeconomics, better known as Animal Spiritsand its potential in explaining
the forward premium puzzle.
5 Animal Spirits
The provocative phrase originated with Keynes (1936) to describe the underlying set of deep
human behavior that guides macroeconomic activity. The original excerpt from Keynes
(1936) on Animal Spirits reads:
We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves of ir-
rational psychology. On the contrary, the state of long-term expectation is often
steady, and, even when it is not, the other factors exert their compensating ef-
fects. We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions a¤ecting the
future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict math-
ematical expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist;
and that it is our innate urge to activity- or Animal Spirits, which makes the
wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives as best we
7See Sarno and Valente (2005) for more literature based in MS-VECM.
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are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on whim
or sentiment or chance.(Ch.12, p.162-163)
To paraphrase briey (although it is with reluctance since the passage was stated beau-
tifully), human beings do not behave in a strict mathematical (robotic) manner, but rather
a mixture of rationality and evolutionary tendencies. The essence of Animal Spirits has t
within the realm of behavioral macroeconomics, pioneered by Akerlof (2002) who creates
an agenda to be described by behavioral macroeconomics, 1. The existence of involuntary
unemployment, 2. The impact of monetary policy on output and employment, 3. The failure
of deation to accelerate when unemployment is high, 4. The prevalence of undersaving for
retirement, 5. The excessive volatility of stock prices relative to their fundamentals, and 6.
The stubborn persistence of a self-destructive underclass. Akerlofs list of items have been
failed by New Classical and Neo Classical models due to their lack of behavioral insights. To
address his agenda, Akerlof describes behavioral macroeconomics as the incorporation of
realistic assumptions grounded in psychological and sociological observation, have produced
models that comfortably account for each of these macroeconomic phenomena(p.413). An
issue behind behavioral macroeconomics, as De Grauwe (2012) denotes, is that the world
of irrationality is dark and macroeconomists conform to the unanimity of RE theory since
the question of what is an irrational agent?remains robust. However, as Akerlof (2002)
states8:
8For further literature on Animal Spirits see Akerlof and Shiller (2009). Although it is aimed towards
mass-consumption, their work gives numerous examples of how human behavior ts within the context of
real-world macroeconomics.
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Immediately after its publication, the economics profession tamed Keyne-
sian economics. They domesticated it as they translated it into the smooth
mathematics of classical econonomics. But economies, like lions, are wild and
dangerous. Modern behavioral economics has rediscovered the wild side of macro-
economic behavior. Behavioral economists are becoming lion tamers. The task
is as intellectually exciting as it is di¢ cult.(p. 428)
Navigating the jungle, Thomas J. Sargent and Lars Peter Hansen have ventured to bridge
a sub-theory of Optimal Control mathematics into behavioral macroeconomics in order to
capture a specic type of Animal Spirit, namely pessimism.
5.1 Robust Control
Robust Control (RC) is a subset of mathematics derived from Optimal Control theory that
deals with the problem of model misspecication. Control variables induced with a RC pol-
icy aims to achieve robust performance against bounded systematic modeling error terms9.
Hansen and Sargent (2008) explain new control and estimation methods were sought after to
improve upon adverse outcomes that come from applying ordinary control theory to a variety
of engineering and physical problems. A theory is that model misspecication explains why
actual outcomes were sometimes much worse than the results provided by control theory and
thus decision rules and estimators acknowledging model misspecication were desired, hence
the emergence of RC. A long standing issue in macroeconomics is that economic agents are as-
9See Whittle (1981), Whittle (1990), Basar and Bernhard (1995), and Whittle (1996) for works on Robust
Control as a deviation from Rational Expectations.
19
sumed have no systematic biases in forecasting future economic variables (i.e. RE), meaning
agents fully trusttheir models. As a way to relax this assumption, a malevolent nature
is assumed to lurk subliminally within the economic environment, existing separately from
households, and cause systematic perturbations to householdssystematic understanding of
the economy, whose objective is to minimize household utility. Economic agents, realizing
what is systematically expected to happen deviates from what systematically actually hap-
pens10, induces a fear that their understanding of the economys evolution is quite correct
or, in other words, they fear model misspecication so as to not fully trust their model. The
discrepancy between what agents believe and what actually happens induces fear where this
fear manifests itself as pessimism, captured via a parameter .
To formally show the di¤erence between a RE and RC problem (as well as provide
technical-intuition), we begin by introducing macroeconomics oriented in RE which can be
cast in a Linear-Quadratic Control (LQC) framework11, a technique that accommodates a
wide ranging class of linear DSGE models. A typical linearized DSGE model cast within the
framework of LQC takes the (simple) form,
max
futg1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
xt
ut
37777775
0 26666664
R 0
0 Q
37777775
26666664
xt
ut
37777775
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(14)
10At this point, we deviate from traditional RE and behavioral macroeconomics is incorporated within
expectation formation.
11A technique which is part of modern control theory.
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s:t: xt+1 = Axt +But + C"t+1
where R, Q, A, B, and C are coe¢ cient matrices, xt is a state variable vector, ut is a
control variable vector, and "t+1 is a Gaussian white-noise vector. (14) is cast in a LQC
setting where economic agents maximize their objective function via the control variable, ut,
and take the state-evolution constraint as an exogenous process. This optimization problem
is within the framework of RE because as can be seen from the state variables transition
equation, only random errors perturb the evolutionary process of the economy. Once a DSGE
model has been linearlized and put in the form of (14), the argument can be transformed
into a linear-dynamic programming problem via a Bellman equation (assuming the Certainty
Equivalence Principle12),
x0tPxt = maxfutg
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
xt
ut
37777775
0 26666664
R 0
0 Q
37777775
26666664
xt
ut
37777775+ x
0
t+1Pxt+1
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(15)
s:t: xt+1 = Axt +But
where it is assumed that the value function takes on a quadratic form, or V (x) = x0tPxt
and P is a costate variable matrix which serves strictly as a mathematical construct used
12This rule is a mathematical convenience which states that a decision rule derived from a stochastic
optimal control problem is equivalent to that derived from a static one. Technicaly, this is allows for setting
"t+1 = 0 and eliminating the expectations operator, essentially creating a static optimal control problem.
21
to nd a stable steady-state solution which will be described in further detail below. Now,
inserting the static constraint of (15) into its objective function and optimizing by choice of
control variable ut the following optimal decision rule is derived,
ut = Fxt (16)
so that F =   (R + B0PB) 1B0PA. (16) denotes the optimal decision made by
households given the state of the economy xt at time t. The Riccatti equation can be
derived out of (15) where,
P = Q+ A
h
P   PB (R + B0PB) 1B0P
i
A (17)
where in (17) P is initialized by an identity matrix and iteration occurs until converging
on a steady-state matrix, P  which is inserted into F dening a stable optimal policy rule.
Once a stable rule has been dened, economic agentsoptimal decisions feed back into the
evolution process of the economy so that,
xt+1 = A
0xt + C"t+1 (18)
and A0 = (A+BF ). Thus, (18) is the equilibrium exogenous process generating dynam-
ics within the economy that agents optimally respond to. The fundamental problem with
this form of control theory is that actual results observed in nature are sometimes far worse
than the simulations behind (16) using (18) causing an inquiry into other types of control
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analysis that deviate from RE specication in the state-evolution system of (14). In order for
an optimal decision rule to accommodate model misspecication, RC is introduced within
LQC context so that,
max
futg1t=0
min
fwt+1g1t=0
 Et
1X
t=0
t
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
xt
ut
37777775
0 26666664
R 0
0 Q
37777775
26666664
xt
ut
37777775+ w
0
t+1wt+1
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(19)
s:t: xt+1 = Axt +But + Cwt+1 + C"t+1
where now (19) represents a two-player Stacklberge game where the malevolent nature
(minimizing player) that enters the optimization system quadratically and uses wt+1 as a
way of minimizing household utility, indirectly manipulating the parameter , or household
pessimism. The deviation from RE especially becomes apparent through the state-evolution
system in (19) where xt+1 is not only randomly perturbed by "t+1 but also systematically
perturbed by wt+1 as well, implying that agents do not have a deep understanding of the
economys evolutionary tendencies and hence cannot make reliable systematic forecasts, cast-
ing doubt or distrust of their beliefs about actual economic values. Continuing, (19) can be
converted into a Bellman equation and assuming Certainty Equivalence we have,
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 x0tPxt = maxfutg minfwt+1g
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
26666664
xt
ut
37777775
0 26666664
R 0
0 Q
37777775
26666664
xt
ut
37777775+ w
0
t+1wt+1   x0t+1Pxt+1
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(20)
s:t: xt+1 = Axt +But + Cwt+1
unfortunately, the solution method is not quite as simple as (15). The problem presented
in (20) is independent of sequencing13 so that the minimizing player optimizes rst and
assumes that the maximizing player is carrying out their optimal decision rule (16) so that
the malevolent natures problem reduces to,
min
fwt+1g

w0t+1wt+1   x0t+1Pxt+1
	
(21)
s:t: xt+1 = A
0xt + Cwt+1
Inserting the constraint into its objective function results in an unconstrained minimiza-
tion problem that yields the rst order condition (FOC),
wt+1 = Kxt (22)
13Meaning the solution method is independent of whether minimization or maximization is chosen rst.
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where K =  1
 
I    1C0PC 1C0PA0. The intuition behind (22) is that based on
economys state xt, a malevolent nature will choose a sequence of worst-caseshocks, wt+1
that minimize the maximizing players utility. Additionally, an artifact derived from (21) by
taking the derivative with respect to xt in the unconstrained optimization problem results
in,
D (P ) = P + PC (I   C0PC) 1C0P (23)
where (23) represents a portion of the Ricatti equation derived from the minimization
partof (20). Intuitively speaking, (23) is information the minimizing player uses to sublim-
inally imbed their malevolent schematic within the maximizing players optimization prob-
lem. Now that the minimizing player has optimized, the maximizing player chooses next
and assumes the world is systematically unbias, implying wt+1 = 0 so that,
x0tD (P )xt = maxfutg
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
xt
ut
37777775
0 26666664
R 0
0 Q
37777775
26666664
xt
ut
37777775+ x
0
t+1D (P )xt+1
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(24)
s:t: xt+1 = Axt +But
where V (x) = x0tD (P )xt is a minimized value function that households unknowingly
maximize against (hence the malevolent nature lurking in the background). Taking the
FOC of (24) results in,
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ut = Fxt (25)
and F =   (R + B0D (P )B) 1B0D (P )A. (25) is similar to (16) but here (23) is
embedded instead. The full Ricatti equation can be derived by taking the derivative of
unconstrained optimization problem with respect to xt or,
T (P ) = Q+ A0
h
D (P )  D (P )B (R + B0D (P )B) 1B0D (P )
i
A (26)
now iterating on (23) until convergence and inserting into (22) and (25) for K and F
respectively yield stable FOCs for the minimizing and maximizing players. Once stability is
reached, insert both FOCs into the constraint from (19) resulting in an equilibrium transition
equation,
xt+1 = eAxt + C"t+1 (27)
where eA = (A+BF + CK). Notice that the di¤erence between equilibrium transition
equations of (18) and (27) is that the latter accounts for systematic misspecication captured
via the extra CK term embedded within the system. Now that the economy is in equilibrium
households realize that there is discrepancy between what they systematically thought is
happening (this belief is reected by the constraint from (24) known as the approximating
system) and what is systematically actually happening ( where this actuality is represented
by the constraint in (20) known as the perturbed system) which induces fear or pessimism
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through the parameter . Without too much technical detail, the further the economy
deviates systematically from what is expected to occur, the higher a householdspessimism
which is intuitive because, as human beings, if an event occurs worse than expected this
causes pessimism which corrects our next forecast by discounting our expectations closer to
what is observed in reality. To close this explanation, for an optimal value function iterate
(26) until convergence and inserting into the value function results in,
V  (xt) = x0t T D (P )xt (28)
where V  (xt) represents an optimized value function, xt is an equilibrium state equation
containing steady-state FOCs (22) and (25), and T  D (P ) is the Riccatti equation (26)
evaluated at (23). Hopefully this segment has given the reader context and intuition behind
RC problems and methodology.
Literature applying RC to the forward premium puzzle is extremely scarce. Li and Tornell
(2008) apply RC to a simple investor model of exchange rates to account for the forward
premium anomaly. According to the authors, in equilibrium optimizing investors do not
hold misperceptions about their model and distort their forecasts to in an attempt to attain
robustness against potential misspecication. Additionally, this forecast distortion triggers
delayed overreaction of exchange rates with respect to interest rate di¤erential disturbances
directly leading to a negative correlation between those exchange rates and interest rate
di¤erentials, hence an accounting of the forward premium anomaly.
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6 Conclusion
This work is not exhaustive as the eld pertaining to the famous forward premium puzzle and
Animal Spirits is extremely large. The discussion presented above was an attempt to aim the
reader towards a direction of foundational works and those literature that set the stage for
present and future research. Macroeconomics has been a thriving and provocative enterprise
contributing to great advancements of to our social complex. The advent of Behavioral
Macroeconomics hopes to unite elements of economics, psychology, and sociology in order
to gain a better understanding of our economic system. By introducing and explaining a
well-known international puzzle, dissecting it into three branches of major research (those
concerning RE, Risk Premia, and econometric implementation) and discussing RC, hopefully
the reader has gained perspective behind Behavioral Macroeconomics and its application to
di¢ cult questions posed by the science.
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CHAPTER 2 INCORPORATING ROBUST CONTROL IN AN INTERNA-
TIONALDSGEMODEL: CANPESSIMISMEXPLAIN THE FORWARDPRE-
MIUM PUZZLE?
7 Introduction
Keynes (1936) introduced the concept of "Animal Spirits" into economic literature,
describing a set of human characteristics underlying macroeconomic activity. The advent
and implementation of Robust Control (RC) by Hansen and Sargent (2008) in traditional
Rational Expectations (RE) framework allows agents to realize initial systematic expecta-
tions di¤er from actual systematic occurrences, where this discrepancy induces fear of model
misspecication or "pessimism", a specic type of Animal Spirit, in households. Building
on research discussed in Shkrelja (Ch.1, 2014), this work uses a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) two-country two-money model from Lucas (1982), tted with RC es-
sentially equipping households with pessimism, the penultimate component in solving the
well-documented forward premium puzzle14 (FPP). Varying pessimism regimes both emulate
data features and validate RE assumptions about movements in forward premium (discount)
estimator, fully transmitting to movements in the gross rate of depreciation (appreciation).
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 8 denes the model, Section 9 calibrates
pessimism, Section 10 derives FPP bias and estimation results, Section 11 concludes.
14See Fama (1984), Engle (1996), Sarno (2005), and Chinn (2007), among others.
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8 Model
8.1 Inducing Malevolent Nature
Household agents ("maximizing player") believes the state of the world evolves according to
AR(1) stochastic processes; known as the approximating system of stochastic equations, so
xt+1 =
Systematic beliefz }| {
(1  1) + 1xt + "xt+1 (29)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + "yt+1 (30)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + "Mt+1 (31)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + "Nt+1 (32)
where xt+1 is domestic output, yt+1 is foreign output, Mt+1 is gross domestic money
supply, Nt+1 is gross foreign money supply, and where the maximizing player believes the
economy to evolve according to their systematic understanding of (94)   (97): In addition
the maximizing player believes error terms are distributed according to
"jt  N(0; 2j) for j = x; y;M;N (33)
where 2j is constant variance term for j = x; y;M;N
Now, the malevolent nature ("minimizing player") perturbs approximating system through
error terms
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xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + g"xt+1 (34)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + g"yt+1 (35)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + g"Mt+1 (36)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + g"Nt+1 (37)
where e"jt for j = x; y;M;N represents perturbed error terms distributed as
e"jt  N(wt+1; 2j) for j = x; y;M;N (38)
e"jt   wt+1  N(0; 2j) for j = x; y;M;N (39)
"jt =
e"jt   wt+1 (40)
e"jt = "jt + wt+1 (41)
where wt+1 is the disruption used by the malevolent nature to systematically perturb
(94)  (97): Inserting (154) for j = x; y;M;N into (147)  (150) yields the perturbed system
of stochastic equations
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xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + wt+1 + "xt+1 (42)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + wt+1 + "yt+1 (43)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + wt+1 + "Mt+1 (44)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + wt+1 + "Nt+1 (45)
Ultimately, (94)  (97) represents the state of nature that the maximizing player assumes
to systematically exist and (155)   (158) represents the state of nature that systematically
actually exists. Next, the Lucas model is outtted with RC.
8.2 Model with Robust Control
8.2.1 Optimization Problem
The international model tted with robust control is represented as,
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fcxt; cxt;
cyt; c
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(1  )
1X
t=0
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
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
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
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
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
= 0
CIAz }| {
mt = Ptcxt
Equity Sharesz }| {
!xt + !

xt = 1
Re source Constraintsz }| {
cxt + c

xt = xt
(46)
nt = P

t cyt !yt + !

yt = 1 cyt + c

yt = yt
(47)
mt = Ptc

xt  Mt +  

Mt = 1 mt +m

t = Mt
(48)
nt = P

t c

yt  Nt +  

Nt = 1 nt + n

t = Nt (49)
Where cxt and cyt represent home good-x and good-y consumption respectively, mt and
nt represent home holdings of home and foreign currency, !xt and !yt represent home output
shares of good-x and good-y respectively valued at price et for !xt and et for !yt ,  Mt and
 Nt represent home holdings of home and foreign currency shares respectively valued at price
rt for  Mt and r

t for  Nt, Pt and St represent home prices and spot exchange rate respec-
tively. Finally, all variables containing * are foreign variable counterparts to the preceding
home variable list. Beginning with the objective function, domestic and foreign households
optimize weighted average CRRA utility (consisting of domestic and foreign consumptions
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of goods x and y), so that t is discount factor,  represents importance of country in decen-
tralized world economy, and 

represent home and foreign pessimism respectively, wt+1 is
malevolent natures control variable, representing an intertemporal sequence of "worst-case"
shocks that are used to perturb (94)   (97): Constraints to the objective function include
home and foreign budget constraints, the rst column of (159)  (160) represents CIA con-
straints, the second and third columns are adding up constraints to close the model where
(94)  (97) and (155)  (158) are the stochastic systems which generate dynamics.
8.2.2 Maximizing Player Chooses First
Household agents choose rst, maximizing their objective function, believing that the econ-
omy evolves according to the approximating system of stochastic equations. Setting up the
Lagrangian, deriving FOCs, nding steady-states, and log-linearlizing around steady-states,
and using matrix-algrebra to simplify results in
eSt = Xt (50)
eFt =  Xt (51)
Remark 1 See Technical Appendix Section 20.2.1 for derivation of (181) and (183) :
35
where  =
24
1  1
35US,   =
24
3  4
35US; and US =
26666664
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777775 ; representing
a selection matrix that allows certain stochastic equations to e¤ect (181) and (183); or spot
and forward exchange rates respectively. Again, maximizing player believes (181) and (183)
to evolve according to (94)-(97), represented in matrix algebra as
Xt+1 = AXt + C"t+1 (52)
where
Xt =
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
fNt
37777777777777777775
; "t+1 =
26666666666666666664
"xt+1
"yt+1
"Mt+1
"Nt+1
37777777777777777775
; A =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 3 0
0 0 0 4
37777777777777777775
; C =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
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8.2.3 Minimizing Player Chooses Second
The malevolent nature assumes the maximizing player is both optimizing and in equilib-
rium15. Exploiting second-order taylor expansion of the objective function and Linear-
Quadratic Gaussian Control (techniques the minimizing players problem results in,
wt+1 = KXt (53)
P = R + A0PA+ A0PC

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PA (54)
Remark 2 See Technical Appendix Section 20.2.2 for derivation of (53) and (229) :
where K =

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PA: Equation (53) represents malevolent natures in-
tertemporal worst-case feed back rule, rather, based on the state of the economy Xt ;nature
chooses a sequence of worst-case outcomes, wt+1; that minimizes the maximizing players
utility. Equation (229) represents the Ricatti equation whose properties are well-known in
control theory. Iterating on (229) until convergence to bP and inserting intoK for (53) results
in a stable worst-case feed back rule, where placing this stable wt+1 into a matrix-algebra
representation of (155)  (158);
Xt+1 = AXt + Cwt+1 + C"t+1 (55)
15Symmetric pessimism is assumed across countries so that  =  + (1   ) where  =  and  is
essentially "world-pessimism."
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results in,
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1 (56)
where A0 =

A+ CK()

:Ultimately, (234) is the dynamic-producing perturbed state-
evolution system embedded with malevolent natures feedback rule wt+1:Intuitively, nature
selects its sequence of worst-case occurrences and places them in (55) so as the economy
evolves agents now realize that (234) produces dynamics, so that what is systematically
expected di¤ers from what systematically happens where this discrepancy induces pessimism
in households, where households are "doubtful" of their expectations of the economy, and is
captured by parameter :
9 Detection Error Probabilities
In order to calibrate or discipline the choice of , detection error probabilities (DEP) must
be used. Low values of DEP mean maximizing players are better at deciphering between
evolution systems (52) and (234), implying households have low pessimism since they are
better at determining what they think is going on and what is actually going on . Alterna-
tively, high values of DEP mean households have di¢ culty in deciphering between evolution
systems (52) and (234), invoking high amounts of pessimism in the households psyche since
they are worse at determining what they think is going on and what is actually going on.
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Let model A denote the approximating stochastic system (52) and Let model B denote
the perturbed stochastic system (234):Dene,
pA = Pr (rjA < 0) (57)
where rjA is the log-likelihood ratio. When model A generates the data, pA measures
the probability that the maximizing player selects model B instead. Similarly dene,
pB = Pr (rjB > 0) (58)
where rjB is the log-likelihood ratio. When model B generates the data, pB measures
the probability that the maximizing player selects model A instead. Following Hansen and
Sargent (2008), the DEP, p, is dened as
p



=
1
2
(pA + pB) (59)
where p is the probability of error in choosing the correct model which implies that 1  p
is the probability of success in choosing the correct model and  is the pessimism parameter
used to generate model B. Since there lies a positive relationship between  and p; as 
decreases its associated p will decrease as well so that the desired level of detection error will
implicitly discipline the value of :For this work, a  is chosen that corresponds to p = 0:100;
following Luo and Young (2010) and Hansen and Sargent (2008), meaning for the level of
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calibrated pessimism, the maximizing player will correctly decipher between model A and
model B 90% of the time. Thus by choosing a specic  that corresponds to a desired DEP,
the choice of  is disciplined.
10 Forward Premium Puzzle
10.1 Downward Bias of Estimator
To generate the forward premium regression, use (181) as dependent variable and (183)
independent variable so that a linear regression can be formed as,
St+1 St = c0 +c1 (Ft St) + et+1 (60)
where is St+1 St the gross rate of depreciation, Ft St is the forward premium,c1 is
the forward premium estimator , c0is intercept estimator, and et+1  N(0; 2) where 2
is constant variance term . To begin analyzing slope and intercept estimators we exploit
relationships developed for gross rate of depreciation and forward premium by inserting
(234) into (181) and (183) for Xt and this expansion into (60), utilize OLS optimization, and
taking the probability limit of both 0 and 1 yields,
plim
c1 = 1  tr [	0V 0Mi (V  Q) 	]tr (	0V 0MiV	) (61)
Remark 3 See Technical Appendix Section 22.1 for derivation of (61) :
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where,
	 =
26666666666666666664
I 0    0
 A0 . . . . . . ...
...
. . . . . . 0
0     A0 I
37777777777777777775
 1 26666666666666666664
C 0    0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0    0 C
37777777777777777775
V  Q =
26666666666664
   A0    0
...
. . .
...
0       A0
37777777777775
Mi =
 
I   ii0
T

and A0 = A+C

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PA where we note that the intercept
estimatorc0 disappears in the probability limit. In (61), the RHS second element is the bias
term that forces c1 downward from 1. Technically speaking, this bias term is an artefact of
RC modeling with  embedded in the term itself via 	 and Q matrices, allowing for misspec-
ication to an extent and ultimately resulting in a robust estimator. Intuitively speaking,
now that economic agents face a malevolent nature that subliminally tries to reduce house-
hold utility, pessimism is induced in the agent to account for systematic evolutions in the
economy that may not have been anticipated. Since the malevolent nature systematically
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perturbs the economy, this behavior induces households to be systematically pessimistic as
well, given the state of the economy they face. Now, given that households are system-
atically pessimistic, this behavior ultimately maps into (61) as a downward bias. Agents,
given their realization that what is systematically forecasted at an initial date may not be
what systematically manifests at a later terminal date (as in RE), now understand that the
economy systematically changes in the time between a forecast of gross rate of depreciation
(forward premium) and the gross rate of depreciation ex-post. Taking state of economy as
given and making a forecast based on that state, agents dont " systematically believe" or
are doubtful of the initial forward premium (of course, because theyre pessimistic) and will
adjust domestic/foreign cash holdings conservatively meaning if, for example, the forward
premium suggests appreciation of domestic currency against foreign then agents wont sell
o¤ the foreign currency (due, again, for fear that things may not go as expected) as much
as they would have under RE (where there is complete condence in things going as ex-
pected due obliviousness of any systematic perturbations) resulting in the ex-post gross rate
of depreciation not appreciating as much as it would have under RE, hence the downward
bias.
10.2 Consistency of Estimator
In this section, to show how biasness disappears so as to establish consistency, we begin with
taking the limit of  !1 to (61) or,
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lim
!1
n
plim
c1o = 1 (62)
Remark 4 See Technical Appendix Section 22.2 for derivaiton of (62) :
where (62) is a direct result of (V  Q) = 0 as  ! 1: Intuitively, (62) implies that
as pessimism becomes increasingly large, households become "systematically-oblivious" to
any perturbations in their beliefs about the economys evolution since they are abysmal at
deciphering between what is believed and what is actually occurring. Continuing with this
logic, if agents are unaware of perturbations then they do not behave in a systematically
conservative manner, eliminating downward bias altogether.
10.3 Estimation & Simulation
Using $=$ 1-month forward exchange rate data in quarterly frequency from 1986:III to
2013:III (Bank of England) and $=$ spot exchange rate data in quarterly frequency from
1986:III to 2013:III (St. Louis Federal Reserve) so as to create the gross rate of depreciation
as well as the forward premium, and using OLS regression (60) yields,
St+1 St =   0:000897
(0:0042)
  0:2037
(0:0966)
(Ft St) + et+1 (63)
where c0 =  0:000897 andc1 =  0:2037 with their respective standard deviations given
in parenthesis where () implies signicance at both 5% and 10% alpha levels. The slope
coe¢ cient of (63) means if the forward premium,Ft St; increases by 1% then the change
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Figure 1: Slope Coe¢ cient Estimator PDF Simulation
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in the spot exchange rate,St+1 St; will decrease (appreciate) by 0.2037% and the intercept
term is statistically indi¤erent from 0. The puzzle is evident in (63) because the a priori
hypothesis implied above that 1 > 0 is clearly violated as c1 < 0: Thus, the downward
bias is prevalent in the data. Now, using pseudo-produced16 observations from (181)  (183)
generated by (234) with pessimism corresponding to p



= 10%; the regression becomes,
St+1 St = 0:0668
(0:1476)
+ 0:7712
(0:1719)
(Ft St) + et+1 (64)
where c0 = 0:0668 and c1 = 0:7712 with their respective standard deviations given
in parenthesis where () implies signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% alpha levels. The slope
coe¢ cient of (63) means if the forward premium,Ft St; increases by 1% then the change in
the gross rate of depreciation,St+1 St; increases (depreciates further ex-post) by 0.7712%
and the intercept term is statistically indi¤erent from 0. Thus,  " means downward bias
diminishes resulting inc1 ! 1. Alternatively, using an identical experiment with p = 0%
16See Technical Appendix Section 6.4 for simulation procedure.
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instead implies,
St+1 St = 0:1432
(0:2210)
  0:0640
(0:0279)
(Ft St) + et+1 (65)
where c0 = 0:1432 andc1 =  0:0640 .The slope coe¢ cient of (63) means if the forward
premium,Ft St; increases by 1% then the change in the gross rate of depreciation,St+1 St;
decreases (appreciates further ex-post) by 0.0640% and the intercept term is statistically
indi¤erent from 0. Thus,  # means downward bias exacerbates so much that it results in
(for this case) c1 < 0: By implementing a lower amount of pessimism in the model, (65)
captures a main feature of (63) in that c1 < 0 and veries arguments developed above.
For concreteness, Figure (1) shows Gaussian Monte-Carlo simulations conducted for normal
PDFs ofc1 5,000 times for various 0s where the transition from positive to negative domain
can be seen as  decreases and hence p



decreases, which again implies that as pessimism
decreases in agents, forward premium bias is exacerbated.
11 Conclusion
Ultimately, Animal Spirits can play an important role in macroeconomic activity when ex-
pressed through appropriate models. In this paper, the FP bias was contained through
exploiting relationships developed in an international DSGE model tted with RC and it
was shown that biasness disappears when households are "systematically-oblivious" or have
high amounts of pessimism,. By using varying regimes of pessimism, both features of the
data (negative relationship between (St+1   St) and (Ft   St) exists) and unbiasness of un-
covered interest parity (positive relationship between (St+1   St) and (Ft   St) exists) were
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produced in the forward premium estimator c1:
Exploration within behavioral macroeconomic framework is benecial in that this type of
framework o¤ers explanations into various economic inquiries. Implementing psychological
behaviors of households within economic models can facilitate further understanding how
complex systems, such as exchange rates, operate.
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CHAPTER 3 AN INQUIRY INTO PESSIMISM: USING DETECTION ER-
ROR PROBABILITIES TO CALIBRATE AN ANIMAL SPIRIT
12 Introduction
Since Keynes (1936) development of Animal Spirits within macroeconomic literature,
economists such as Akerlof (2002), Hansen and Sargent (2008), and Akerlof and Shiller
(2009) have strived to incorporate deviations from rational expectations (RE) into main-
stream macroeconomics, hence the advent of behavioral macroeconomics. Hansen and Sar-
gent venture from simple deviations of RE by incorporating robust control (RC) within a
max-min optimization framework and press that one particular Animal Spirit, namely pes-
simism, is captured through a parameter,:Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) incorporate RC and
use pessimism (or model uncertainty) in an intertemporal current account model which is
grounded in linear-quadratic permanent income hypothesis17 to account for international
consumption and current account patterns. In growth theory literature, Bidder and Smith
(2012) incorporate RC so that agents become pessimistic where under model uncertainty
adverse shocks become more volatile, negatively impacting economic growth.
Outside of the general implementation of RC in dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) settings for studying specic variables , there lies scarce examination of using de-
tection error probabilities (DEP)18 as prescribed by Hansen and Sargent (2008) to, not only
17See Hall (1978).
18See Burnham and Anderson (1998) for an exhaustive study of detection error probabilities and the
statistical theory of model selection in general.
47
calibrate pessimism, but to compare simulated pessimism to data-driven pessimism. This
work sees to examine the proximity that a macroeconomic model is able to generate behav-
ioral tendencies of real households, by way of DEP. In order to execute such a comparison,
a Lucas (1982) two-country two money model is tted with RC, so that international agents
contain a fear of model misspecication, or pessimism. Ultimately, there lies two stochastic
processes 1. The "approximating system" that preserves RE and 2. The "perturbed sys-
tem" that incorporates a systematic sequence of worst-case shocks to the economy. These
two models induce a selection problem to agents, and depending on the ability of the agent to
select the correct data generating process (measured by DEP) will determine how pessimistic
the agent is, where data-driven and simulation-driven pessimism are compared.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 13 introduces the international DSGEmodel,
Section 14 utilizes artefacts from the model into DEP methodology, Section 15 produces
results from estimation and simulation, Section 16 concludes.
13 Model
In order to have a fruitful discussion about DEP, the Lucas (1982) international dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model embedded with Robust Control (RC) introduced
in Shkrelja (Ch.2, 2014) is reproduced here for convenience,
48
max
fcxt; cxt;
cyt; c

yt;
!xt; !

xt;
!yt; !

yt;
 Mt;  

Mt;
 Nt;  

Ntg1t=0
min
fwt+1g1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
(

"
 (c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + w
2
t+1
#
+ (1  )
"
 (c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + 
w2t+1
#)
s:t: 
1X
t=0
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !xtet + !yte

t +  Mtrt +  Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1   StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1
  Mt 1Mt
Pt
   Nt 1StNt
Pt
  !xt 1et   !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt

= 0
49
(1  )
1X
t=0
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !

xtet + !

yte

t +  

Mtrt +  

Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1  
StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1
  

Mt 1Mt
Pt
   

Nt 1StNt
Pt
  !xt 1et   !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt

= 0
CIAz }| {
mt = Ptcxt
Equity Sharesz }| {
!xt + !

xt = 1
Re source Constraintsz }| {
cxt + c

xt = xt
(66)
nt = P

t cyt !yt + !

yt = 1 cyt + c

yt = yt
(67)
mt = Ptc

xt  Mt +  

Mt = 1 mt +m

t = Mt
(68)
nt = P

t c

yt  Nt +  

Nt = 1 nt + n

t = Nt (69)
Where cxt and cyt represent home good-x and good-y consumption respectively, mt and
nt represent home holdings of home and foreign currency, !xt and !yt represent home output
shares of good-x and good-y respectively valued at price et for !xt and et for !yt ,  Mt and
 Nt represent home holdings of home and foreign currency shares respectively valued at price
rt for  Mt and r

t for  Nt, Pt and St represent home prices and spot exchange rate respec-
tively. Finally, all variables containing * are foreign variable counterparts to the preceding
home variable list. Beginning with the objective function, domestic and foreign households
optimize weighted average CRRA utility (consisting of domestic and foreign consumptions
of goods x and y), so that t is discount factor,  represents importance of country in decen-
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tralized world economy, and 

represent home and foreign pessimism respectively, wt+1 is
malevolent natures control variable, representing an intertemporal sequence of "worst-case"
shocks that are used minimize household utility. Constraints to the objective function in-
clude home and foreign budget constraints, the rst column of (66)   (69) represents CIA
constraints, the second and third columns are adding up constraints. To close the model,
the stochastic system pertaining to no systematic deviations, or the approximating system;is
represented as,
xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + "xt+1 (70)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + "yt+1 (71)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + "Mt+1 (72)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + "Nt+1 (73)
where xt+1 is domestic output, yt+1 is foreign output, Mt+1 is gross domestic money
supply, Nt+1 is gross foreign money supply. The stochastic system associated with systematic
deviations, or the perturbed system, is represented as,
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xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + wt+1 + "xt+1 (74)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + wt+1 + "yt+1 (75)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + wt+1 + "Mt+1 (76)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + wt+1 + "Nt+1 (77)
where wt+1 is represented as a systematic perturbation to an economic agents under-
standing of (70)   (73) : Now, as discussed in Shkrelja (Ch.2, 2014), out of the maximizing
players problem, log linearized rst-order conditions (FOCs) in matrix form for both spot
exchange rate, St and forward exchange rate, Ft can be derived. For purposes of this discus-
sion, the approximating system (70)  (73) can be represented log-linearized matrix-algebra
form,
Xt+1 = AXt + C"t+1 (78)
where,
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Xt =
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
fNt
37777777777777777775
; "t+1 =
26666666666666666664
"xt+1
"yt+1
"Mt+1
"Nt+1
37777777777777777775
; A =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 3 0
0 0 0 4
37777777777777777775
; C =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
and ext; eyt; fMt; fNt are log-linearized counterparts to xt; yt; Mt; Nt respectively. Next, the
optimal worst-case sequence (and its associated Riccatti equation for stabilization matrix P )
chosen by the malevolent nature, wt+1 can be derived from the minimizing players problem
as in Shkrelja (2014b) which feeds back into the perturbed system (74)   (77) ultimately
resulting in,
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1 (79)
where A0 =

A+ CK()

; which contains householdspessimism, 19: The purpose of
the next section is to utilize (78) and (79) in calibrating pessimism via DEP methodology.
19Introduced from Shkrelja (2014b), "world-pessimism,"  , is a weighted-average of home and foreign
pessimism ( and 

respectively) or,  = +(1  ) : See the Technical Appendix Section 4.2.2 for more
details.
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14 Detection Error Probabilities
The intuition behind (78) and (79) play a role into the following DEP analysis. Both ap-
proximating and perturbed systems will essentially be "chosen" some fraction of the time,
where depending on which model correctly generates the state of nature and that chosen by
the economic agents, will determine to what percentage the agent is incorrect in deciphering
the true state of nature. This will, indirectly, discipline the choice of pessimism used in the
model from Section 2. To begin, the approximating stochastic system is specied as "Model
A,"
Xt+1 = AXt + Cd"t+1 (80)
where (80) is essentially equivalent to (78) with the exception ofd"t+1; which are normally
distributed error terms whose mean is implicitly perturbed by the malevolent natures se-
quence of worst-case shocks, wt+1 or d"t+1  N (wt+1; 2) where 2 is a constant variance20.
Alternatively, the perturbed stochastic system will be dened as "Model B,"
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1 (81)
where, again, (81) is equivalent to (79) where error terms are now normally distributed
with a mean of zero or, "t+1  N (0; 2) with constant variance 2: It is stressed that the
discipline of pessimism is determined indirectly through (81) since A0 is embedded with
20See Section 2.1 of Shkrelja (2014b) for futher details on perturbed error terms.
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:Both Model A and Model B are used in Log-Likelihood Ratio Tests (LRT), where through
these tests pessimism can be indirectly calibrated. The intuition behind a LRT is that it is
basically used to compare the t of two models, where one of the models is a special case
of the other model. The test, based primarily on the likelihood ratio, determines how likely
a data set exists in one model over the other. In terms of this papers analysis, (80) is a
special case of (81) where wt+1 = 0 is assumed in the former. By adjusting  the likelihood
of which model exists given a set of data is manipulated to a degree, until a desired DEP is
achieved.
14.1 Log-Likelihood Ratio Test with Model A
Initially, it is assumed that the malevolent natures sequence of worst-cast shocks are gener-
ated under Model A,
wAt+1 = KX
A
t+1 (82)
where (82) is an FOC of the minimizing players problemwhereK =

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PA
and XAt+1 is produced under Model A. Next, the innovations to (80) are dened as,
Xt+1 = AXt + Cd"t+1
Cd"t+1 = Xt+1   AXt
d"t+1 = (C 0C) 1C 0 (Xt+1   AXt) (83)
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so that d"t+1 is primarily a mapping of the discrepancy between a one-period in advance
state of the economy, Xt+1 and its dependency on the current state, AXt: Similarly, the
innovation to (81) are dened as,
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1
C"t+1 = Xt+1   A0Xt
"t+1 = (C
0C) 1C 0
 
Xt+1   A0Xt

"t+1 = (C
0C) 1C 0 (Xt+1   AXt)  (C 0C) 1C 0CKXt (84)
where A0 = (A+ CK) was used. if the fact that d"t+1 = (C 0C) 1C 0 (Xt+1   AXt) and
since (C 0C) 1C 0C = I4, the second element of the right-hand side of (84) can be equated to
wt+1 so that (84) is ultimately consolidated to,
"t+1 = d"t+1   wt+1 (85)
so that "t+1 in (85)accounts for wt+1: Alternatively it can be easily seen, algebraically
speaking, that the systematic error, wt+1; in a linear combination with random error term,
"t+1; forms the perturbed error term d"t+1: Now that both (83) and (85) have been dened
from (80) and (81) respectively, the log-likelihood tests can be constructed with respect to
Model A and Model B as,
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where Log LA is the log-likelihood associated with innovations constructed from Model
A (as implied by the subscript A), Log LB is the log-likelihood associated with innovations
constructed from Model B (as implied by the subscript B), and T is the total number of
periods within a time-series data set ranging from time t = 0; :::; T   1: Using (86) and (87)
the log-likelihood ratio test conditional on Model A can nally be constructed,
rjA = Log LA   Log LB
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t=0

1
2
 d"t+1   wAt+10  d"t+1   wAt+1  12  d"t+10d"t+1

=
1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
 d"t+10d"t+1  d"t+10wAt+1   wA0t+1d"t+1 + wA0t+1wAt+1  12  d"t+10d"t+1

hence,
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rjA = 1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
wA0t+1w
A
t+1  
1
2
wA0t+1d"t+1 (88)
where "t+1 = d"t+1   wt+1 was used and since Model A is assumed to be the true data
generating process, malevolent natures sequence of worst-case shocks can be reinterpreted as
wt+1 = w
A
t+1: Basically, (88) is simulated through a large number of T observations assuming
wAt+1 = KX
A
t+1 and the number of times rjA < 0 is summed, resulting in a probability
conditional on Model A or more formally21,
pA = Pr (rjA < 0) (89)
where pA gives the probability associated with an economic agent choosing Model B,
when in fact, the true data generating process is Model A. Thus, pA denotes the fraction of
time an economic agent incorrectly chooses Model B so that 1  pA species the fraction of
time the agent correctly chooses Model A. The full DEP has not been fully crafted however,
a similar exercise needs to be conducted for the log-likelihood with respect to Model B.
14.2 Log-Likelihood Ratio Test with Model B
A strategy similar to the exercise for constructing rjA can be also be done for log-likelihood
conditional on Model B instead, where now the malevolent natures worst-case sequence is
assumed to be generated from Model B,
21See Technical Appendix Section 5.4 for further details on simulation strategy for pA.
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wBt+1 = KX
B
t+1 (90)
where XBt+1 is produced from (81). Additionally, (86) and (87) can be used to construct
the log-likelihood ratio test under Model B (following a similar procedure to constructing
rjA),
rjB =   1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
wB0t+1w
B
t+1 +
1
2
wB0t+1d"t+1 (91)
from (91) a large sequence of T observations can be simulated from (90) and imple-
mented into (91) and the occurrences of rjB > 0 are summed which results in a probability
conditional on Model B being the true data generating process22,
pB = Pr (rjB > 0) (92)
where pB gives the probability that an economic agent incorrectly selects Model A when
the true data generating process is Model B. Alternatively, 1-pB is the probability that the
economic agent correctly selects Model B.
14.3 The Detection Error Probability
Now that pA and pB have been constructed, both are linearly averaged as in Hansen et. al
(2002), Hansen and Sargent (2008), and Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) so that,
22See Technical Appendix Section 5.4 for further details on simulation strategy for pB .
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p



=
1
2
(pA + pB) (93)
where p



is the objective DEP that describes the probability international households
will incorrectly choose the true data generating process with respect to the model intro-
duced in Section 2. Alternatively, 1  p



implies the fraction of time that international
households correctly choose the true data generating process. Values of  are initially very
large which in turn determine p



and pessimism is then decreased until the desired DEP
is reached. Theoretically speaking, there lies a positive relationship between  and p



where p



! 0:5 as  ! 1 meaning as pessimism becomes increasingly high, interna-
tional households become increasingly worse at deciphering which stochastic process is the
true data generating process, where agents incorrectly select the true state of nature 50% of
the time. Using the theoretical excursion given through this section, both simulated and ac-
tual data values are applied to ultimately produce DEP from (93) and its implied pessimism
value, :
15 Calibrated Pessimism
15.1 Data-Based Pessimism
To generate a comparison between data-driven and simulated pessimism parameters, a brief
overview of the data is necessary. The state vector Xt contains xt designated as aggregate
U.S. real GDP observations in millions of chained 2009 dollars (Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis) in quarterly frequency from 1986:III to 2013:III; yt is dened as U.K. real GDP in
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millions of pounds deated by UK CPI (with base year 2010) in quarterly frequency from
1986:III to 2013:III; Mt is home currency designated as a time-series data vector containing
aggregate U.S. Household Financial Assets and Currency observations (Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis) in quarterly frequency from 1986:III to 2013:III; and Nt is foreign currency
dened as U.K. Household Outstanding Holdings of Notes/Coin (Bank of England) observa-
tions in quarterly frequency from 1986:III to 2013:III. The data vector Xt is then applied to
(88) and (91) in order to generate (89) and (92) respectively. Finally, both (89) and (92) are
linearly averaged to generate (93) where a data-driven world pessimism value is generated
with its associated DEP. Table 1 below gives calibrated  values and their associated DEP
values.
As  increases, it can be seen that its associated DEP, p



increases as well, where for
large values of  the DEP converges towards 0.5000. Within the context of the data and
starting with low values of DEP, p (500:0000) = 0:0000 implies that agents are incorrectly
choosing the true data generating process 0% of the time which alternatively implies that
1  p (500:0000) means households correctly choose the state of nature 100%. Intuitively,
households are fully aware of the systematic bias within the economic environment and factor
this perturbation within their expectations when making forecasts about future economic
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values. On the other hand, for large values of pessimism where  = 11; 000:0000, its asso-
ciated DEP yields p (11; 000:0000) = 0:5000 meaning households incorrectly choose the state
of nature 50% of the time. It can easily be seen that this value also implies 1 p (11; 000:0000),
or households correctly choose the true data generating process 50% of the time. As the
malevolent natures systematic perturbations become more miniscule, it becomes increas-
ingly di¢ cult for the agent to decipher between an approximating stochastic system and its
perturbed system counterpart. This di¢ culty translates as increased pessimism in house-
holds where there lies an equal chance in correctly and incorrectly realizing what is actually
occurring within the economic environment.
15.2 Simulation-Based Pessimism
In this section, pessimism and associated DEP values are calibrated using simulations from
systems (80) and (81) where the coe¢ cient matrix A of both systems are estimated from the
same data described in Section 4.123. The resulting state vectors of both systems are then
23See Technical Appendix Section 7.2 for details on estimation procedure.
62
used to generate (93) where Table 2 lists calibrated values of both pessimism and related
DEP values24.
Same principles apply to Table 2 as in Table 1 where as increasingly large values of
pessimism lead associated DEP values converging towards 0.5000. Here, simulated pessimism
of  = 798:8450 results in p (798:8450) = 0:0000 implying as before that agents incorrectly
choose the true data generating process 0% of the time implying agents correctly choose
the true data generating process 100% of the time. Alternatively, simulated pessimism of
 = 14; 000:0000 implies p (14; 000:0000) = 0:4693 where households incorrectly choose the
state of nature 46.93% of the time and 1   p (14; 000:0000) implies agents correctly choose
53.07% of the time.
To clearly see the di¤erence between data-driven and simulated pessimism values, Figure
1 plots values of Table 1 and Table 2 within the same diagram. The blue line indicates
values generated from the data and the red-line from simulation and it can be seen that
as pessimism continues into larger values, both lines converge towards 0.5000. Clearly, for
24See Technical Appendix Section 5.4 for simulation strategy.
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each  value, its associated p



is understated in the simulation when compared to their
data-driven counterparts, essentially inating the selection ability of agents. This implies
that agents within the simulation can better decipher between states of nature than what the
data suggests, for all values of pessimism. For low values of pessimism where p



< 0:1000,
the simulated DEPs perform rather well against the data as there is not a large discrepancy
present, however shortly beyond the p



= 0:1000 threshold, there lies a large distance
between simulated and data-based DEPs, until high values of pessimism are reached where
both lines eventually converge.
This "inated-selction ability" of the simulated model over its data counterpart suggests
that the behavioral nature of international economic agents is not well described by the model
in Section 2 for a broad range of pessimism, especially those for p



> 0:1000. The data
suggests that for values of pessimism, people are actually not very good at selecting between
what they think and what actually is going on (which, through natural observation, is not far
from truth), when comparing to simulated pessimism. Through a simple thought experiment,
if the behavioral nature of international agents can be accounted for, estimators produced
from FOC artefacts of Section 2s model (when estimated under some statistical procedure)
could produce results closer to reality. It must be noted that both  and p



are context-
specic as far as what data is used and how the coe¢ cient matrix A is estimated. Changing
the methodology alters the outcome of both pessimism and DEP, suggesting a di¤erent
stochastic representation of (70)   (73) or estimation procedure to A could dampen the
behavioral discrepancy between data and simulation. Additionally, it is assumed that "world-
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Figure 2: Simulated vs. Data-Based Pessimism
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pessimism" or  has been assumed to be a weighted average of domestic (US) pessimism,
 and foreign (UK) pessimism, 

so that both are essentially homogenous ( = 

), when
calibrating : Perhaps separating each term into non-homogenous components so that  6= 
would be more appropriate in trying to match simulated pessimism with what data suggests.
16 Conclusion
This work has strived to capture the behavioral nature of international economic agents
with respect to pessimism. Through a two-country, two-money international DSGE model
incorporated with RC, two stochastic systems (approximating and perturbed systems) were
assumed exist causing a selection problem for households. Through detection error proba-
bility estimation methodology, the ability of agents to realize which state of nature is the
true data generating process is reected in how pessimistic an agent is so that the lower an
agentsability to correctly select a true data generating process, the higher the agentspes-
simism. To account for this behavioral phenomenon empirically, US and UK data was taken
65
and applied to DEP methodology to generate data and simulation-based pessimism values
and their associated DEPs. The simulated model inated householdsability to select ap-
propriate models when compared to the data, so the stylized international economy perhaps
is not the most e¤ective in trying to capture context-specic macroeconomic behaviors.
Other issues associated with the discrepancy between simulated and data-based pes-
simism is the stochastic structure of approximating and perturbed systems, estimation
methodology of the coe¢ cient matrix A; and the homogeneity assumption of :These av-
enues for future research could potentially enhance proximity of simulated pessimism to its
data counterpart, and bring behavioral macroeconomics closer to explaining Animal Spirits.
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APPENDIX
17 Elements
 Home Country Utility Function
u(cxt; cyt) =
(cxtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   (94)
 Foreign Country Utility Function
u(cxt; c

yt) =
(c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   (95)
 Home Country Budget Constraint
cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !xtet + !yte

t +  Mtrt +  Ntr

t =
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1
+
StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1 +
 Mt 1Mt
Pt
+
 Nt 1StNt
Pt
+ !xt 1et + !yt 1et
+  Mt 1rt +  Nt 1r

t (96)
 Foreign Country Budget Constraint
cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !

xtet + !

yte

t +  

Mtrt +  

Ntr

t =
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1
+
StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1 +
 Mt 1Mt
Pt
+
 Nt 1StNt
Pt
+ !xt 1et + !

yt 1e

t
+  Mt 1rt +  

Nt 1r

t (97)
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 Cash-in-Advance Constraints
mt  Ptcxt
nt  P t cyt (98)
mt  Ptcxt (99)
nt  P t cyt (100)
 Adding-Up Constraints
!xt + !

xt = 1 (101)
!yt + !

yt = 1 (102)
 Mt +  

Mt = 1 (103)
 Nt +  

Nt = 1 (104)
cxt + c

xt = xt (105)
cyt + c

yt = yt (106)
mt +m

t = Mt (107)
nt + n

t = Nt (108)
 Stochastic Processes
xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + "xt+1 (109)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + "yt+1 (110)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + "Mt+1 (111)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + "Nt+1 (112)
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18 Equilibrium
18.1 Centralized Economy
For simplicity, the log utility functions of (94) and (95) respectively can be dened as
log u(cxt; cyt) =  log(cxt) + (1  ) log(cyt) (113)
log u(cxt; c

yt) =  log(c

xt) + (1  ) log(cyt) (114)
The central planner maximizes a weighted average of (113) and (114) subject to (105)
and (106).
max
fcxt;cyt;cxt;cytg1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t

 [ log(cxt) + (1  ) log(cyt)] + (1  )

 log(cxt) + (1  ) log(cyt)
	
s:t: cxt + c

xt = xt
cyt + c

yt = yt
The central planners problem can be reduced to a static problem (where t = 0)
max
cx;cy ;cx;cy
 [ log(cx) + (1  ) log(cy)] + (1  )

 log(cx) + (1  ) log(cy)

s:t: cx + c

x = x
cy + c

y = y
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Inserting (106) and (107) into the object function yields an unconstrained maximization
problem
max
cx;cy
 [ log(cx) + (1  ) log(cy)] + (1  ) [ log(cx   x) + (1  ) log(cy   y)]
Optimizing the unconstrained objective function w.r.t control variables yields F.O.Cs
@
@cx
= 0 :

cx
  (1  ) 
x  cx = 0 (115)
@
@cy
= 0 :
(1  )
cy
  (1  ) (1  )
y   cy = 0 (116)
Using (115)   (116) ,(106)   (107) , and allowing time to evolve the pareto e¢ cient
allocations become
cxt = (1  )xt (117)
cyt = (1  ) yt (118)
cxt = xt (119)
cyt = yt (120)
If both countries are weighted equally by the central planner so that  = 1
2
then this
results in a perfect sharing pareto e¢ cient allocation
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cxt =
xt
2
(121)
cyt =
yt
2
(122)
cxt =
xt
2
(123)
cyt =
yt
2
(124)
19 Decentralized Economy
19.1 Home Country Decentralized Economy
Home country maximizes (113) subject to (96)
max
fcxt;cyt;!xt;!yt; Mt; Ntg1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t f log(cxt) + (1  ) log(cyt)g
s:t: cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !xtet + !yte

t +  Mtrt +  Ntr

t =
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1
+
StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1 +
 Mt 1Mt
Pt
+
 Nt 1StNt
Pt
+ !xt 1et + !yt 1et
+ Mt 1rt +  Nt 1r

t
The decentralized problem can be reduced to static form (where t = 0)
max
cx;cy ;!x;!y ; M ; N
[ log(cx) + (1  ) log(cy)]
s:t: cx+
SP 
P
cy +!xe+!ye
+ Mr+ Nr
 = !xx+
SP 
P
!yy+!xe+!ye
+ Mr+ Nr

To "peg" a decentralized allocation that matches the centralized allocation, set !x = !y =
71
 M =  N =
1
2
where inserting these values into (96) for t = 0 , the problem further reduces
to
max
cx;cy
[ log(cx) + (1  ) log(cy)] (125)
s:t: cx +
SP 
P
cy =
1
2

x+
SP 
P
y

(126)
Inserting (126) into (125) the unconstrained maximization problem becomes
max
cy

 log

1
2

x+
SP 
P
y

  SP

P
cy

+ (1  ) log(cy)

@
@cy
= 0 :
 (SP 
P
)
cx
+
(1  )
cy
= 0 (127)
Rearranging (127), applying to (126),and redening SP

P
= q (real exchange rate) the
resulting Home demand functions are
cx =
 (x+ qy)
2
(128)
cy =
 (x+ qy) (1  )
2q
(129)
19.2 Foreign Country Decentralized Economy
Foreign country maximizes (114) subject to (97)
max
fcxt;cyt;!xt;!yt; Mt; Ntg1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t

 log(cxt) + (1  ) log(cyt)
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s:t: cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !

xtet + !

yte

t +  

Mtrt +  

Ntr

t =
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1
+
StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1 +
 Mt 1Mt
Pt
+
 Nt 1StNt
Pt
+ !xt 1et + !

yt 1e

t
+ Mt 1rt +  

Nt 1r

t
The decentralized problem can be reduced to static form (where t = 0)
max
cx;cy ;!x;!y ; M ; 

N
[ log(cx) + (1  ) log(cy)]
s:t: cx+
SP 
P
cy +!

xe+!

ye
+ Mr+ 

Nr
 = !xx+
SP 
P
!yy+!

xe+!

ye
+ Mr+ 

Nr

To "peg" a decentralized allocation that matches the centralized allocation, set !x =
!y =
1
2
=  M =
1
2
=  N =
1
2
where inserting these values into (97) for t = 0, the problem
further reduces to
max
cx;cy
[ log(cx) + (1  ) log(cy)] (130)
s:t: cx +
SP 
P
cy =
1
2

x+
SP 
P
y

(131)
Inserting (131) into (130) the unconstrained maximization problem becomes
max
cy

 log

1
2

x+
SP 
P
y

  SP

P
cy

+ (1  ) log(cy)

@
@cy
= 0 :
 (SP 
P
)
cx
+
(1  )
cy
= 0 (132)
Rearranging (132), applying to (131), and redening SP

P
= q (real exchange rate) the
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resulting Foreign demand functions are
cx =
 (x+ qy)
2
(133)
cy =
 (x+ qy) (1  )
2q
(134)
19.3 World Decentralized Equilibrium
The static version of (101)  (106) necessary for world economy equilibrium are
!x + !

x = 1 (135)
!y + !

y = 1 (136)
 M +  

M = 1 (137)
 N +  

N = 1 (138)
cx + c

x = x (139)
cy + c

y = y (140)
using (128)  (129) with ( 139); or (133)  (134) with (140); and allowing time to evolve
yields the equilibrium real exchange rate associated with decentralized economy
StP

t
Pt
= qt =
xt (1  )
yt
(141)
Finally, Constraints (135)  (140) are satised due to !x = !x = !y = !y =  M =  M =
 N =  

N =
1
2
(perfect risk pooling equilibrium). Using (141); (128)   (129) (133)   (134);
(139)   (140), and allowing time to evolve the resulting decentralized world equilibrium
allocation is
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cxt =
xt
2
(142)
cyt =
yt
2
(143)
cxt =
xt
2
(144)
cyt =
yt
2
(145)
20 Model
20.1 Inducing Malevolent Nature
Maximizing player believes state of the world to evolve according to the approximating
system of stochastic equations, restated for convenience
xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + "xt+1
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + "yt+1
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + "Mt+1
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + "Nt+1
where the maximizing player believes the error terms are distributed according to
"jt  N(0; 2j) for j = x; y;M;N (146)
where 2j is constant variance term for j = x; y;M;N
The minimizing player perturbs approximating system through error terms
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xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + g"xt+1 (147)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + g"yt+1 (148)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + g"Mt+1 (149)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + g"Nt+1 (150)
where e"jt for j = x; y;M;N represents perturbed error terms distributed as
e"jt  N(wt+1; 2j) for j = x; y;M;N (151)e"jt   wt+1  N(0; 2j) for j = x; y;M;N (152)
"jt =
e"jt   wt+1 (153)e"jt = "jt + wt+1 (154)
inserting (154) for j = x; y;M;N into (147) (150) yields the perturbed stochastic system
xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + wt+1 + "xt+1 (155)
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + wt+1 + "yt+1 (156)
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + wt+1 + "Mt+1 (157)
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + wt+1 + "Nt+1 (158)
20.2 Max-Min Optimization Problem
 Objective Function and Budget Constraints
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max
fcxt; cxt;
cyt; c

yt;
!xt; !

xt;
!yt; !

yt;
 Mt;  

Mt;
 Nt;  Ntg1t=0
min
fwt+1g1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
(

"
 (c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + w
2
t+1
#
+ (1  )
"
 (c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + 
w2t+1
#)
s:t: 
1X
t=0
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !xtet + !yte

t +  Mtrt +  Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1   StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1
  Mt 1Mt
Pt
   Nt 1StNt
Pt
  !xt 1et   !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt

= 0
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(1  )
1X
t=0
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !

xtet + !

yte

t +  

Mtrt +  

Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1  
StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1
  

Mt 1Mt
Pt
   

Nt 1StNt
Pt
  !xt 1et   !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt

= 0
where and represent Home and Foreign pessimism respectively, wt+1 is malevolent
natures control variable used to perturb (109)   (112), and  represents importance of
country in decentralized world economy. Remaining constraints are reproduced below for
convenience
 Cash-in-Advance Constraints
mt = Ptcxt (159)
nt = P

t cyt (160)
mt = Ptc

xt (161)
nt = P

t c

yt (162)
note that CIA constraints bind in equilibrium.
 Approximating Stochastic Processes
xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + "xt+1
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + "yt+1
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + "Mt+1
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + "Nt+1
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 Perturbed Stochastic Processes
xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + wt+1 + "xt+1
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + wt+1 + "yt+1
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + wt+1 + "Mt+1
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + wt+1 + "Nt+1
 Adding-Up Constraints
!xt + !

xt = 1
!yt + !

yt = 1
 Mt +  

Mt = 1
 Nt +  

Nt = 1
cxt + c

xt = xt
cyt + c

yt = yt
mt +m

t = Mt
nt + n

t = Nt
20.2.1 Maximizing Player Chooses First
The optimization problem is broken into two components with maximizing player choosing
rst
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max
fcxt; cxt;
cyt; c

yt;
!xt; !

xt;
!yt; !

yt;
 Mt;  

Mt;
 Nt;  Ntg1t=0
  Et
1X
t=0
t
(

"
(cxtc
1 
yt )
1 
1  
#
+ (1  )
"
(c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1  
#)
s:t: 
1X
t=0
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !xtet + !yte

t +  Mtrt +  Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1   StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1
  Mt 1Mt
Pt
   Nt 1StNt
Pt
  !xt 1et   !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt

= 0
(1  )
1X
t=0
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !

xtet + !

yte

t +  

Mtrt +  

Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1  
StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1
  

Mt 1Mt
Pt
   

Nt 1StNt
Pt
  !xt 1et   !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt

= 0
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where (159) (162), (101) (108), and (109) (112) completes maximizing player problem
specication. Forming the lagrangian,
$ = Et
1X
t=0
t
(

"
(cxtc
1 
yt )
1 
1     
1
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !xtet + !yte

t +  Mtrt +  Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1
 StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1  Mt 1Mt
Pt
  Nt 1StNt
Pt
 !xt 1et
 !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt

+(1 )
"
(c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1     
2
t

cxt +
StP

t
Pt
cyt + !

xtet + !

yte

t +  

Mtrt +  

Ntr

t  
Pt 1
Pt
!xt 1xt 1
 StP

t 1
Pt
!yt 1yt 1 
 Mt 1Mt
Pt
  

Nt 1StNt
Pt
 !xt 1et
 !yt 1et    Mt 1rt    Nt 1rt
	
@$
@cxt
= 0 :
 
cxtc
1 
yt
 
c 1xt c
1 
yt   1t = 0 (163)
@$
@cyt
= 0 :
 
cxtc
1 
yt
 
(1  ) cxtc yt   1t
StP

t
Pt
= 0 (164)
@$
@!xt
= 0 :  1t et + Et

1t+1et+1 + 
1
t+1
Pt
Pt+1
xt

= 0 (165)
@$
@!yt
= 0 :  1t et + Et

1t+1e

t+1 + 
1
t+1
St+1P

t
Pt+1
xt

= 0 (166)
@$
@ Mt
= 0 :  1t rt + Et

1t+1rt+1 + 
1
t+1
Mt+1
Pt+1
xt

= 0 (167)
@$
@ Nt
= 0 :  1t rt + Et

1t+1r

t+1 + 
1
t+1
St+1Nt+1
Pt+1
xt

= 0 (168)
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Foreign has an analogous set of F.O.Cs. Using (159)   (162) and (107)   (108) derive
aggregate relative prices
Pt =
Mt
xt
(169)
P t =
Nt
yt
(170)
Solving (163) for 1t ; insert the result along with (169)   (170) into (164)   (168) and
rearranging yields
St =
(1  )Mt
Nt
(171)
et
xt
= Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
1  
et+1
et
+
Mt
Mt+1
#
(172)
et
qtyt
= Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
1   et+1
qt+1yt+1
+
Nt
Nt+1
#
(173)
rt
xt
= Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
1  
rt+1
xt+1
+
Mt+1
Mt+1
#
(174)
rt
xt
= Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
1  
rt+1
xt+1
+
(1  )

Nt+1
Nt+1
#
(175)
where Ct = cxtc
1 
yt : (171)   (175) represent maximizing players Euler equations in
terms of exogenous state variables which evolve according to the approximating system
(109)  (112):Although no explicit foreign exchange market exists in the model , the forward
exchange rate can be written as
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Ft = St
Et

Ct+1
Ct
1 
Nt
Nt+1

Et

Ct+1
Ct
1 
Mt
Mt+1
 (176)
The focus will be on (171) and (176):
Steady-State Beginning with (171) and eliminating time subscripts,
S =
(1  )M
N
(177)
where the bar above each variable represents its steady-state counterpart and M aswell
as N are steady-state Home and Foreign money respectively whose values are developed in
minimizing players section.
Next given (176) and removing time subscripts in addition to expectations operators
results in
F = S


C
C
1 
N
N



C
C
1 
M
M

F = S (178)
where C = cxc
1 
y and both cx aswell as cy values are developed in minimizing players
section.
Log-Linearlization
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Spot Exchange Rate Beginning with and applying Uhligs Method to log-linearlize
(171);
St =
(1  )Mt
Nt
SeeSt = (1  )MefMt
Ne eNt
SN
(1  )M = e
fMt  eNt eSt
1 = e
fMt  eNt eSt (179)
where (177) was used.Taking the rst-order taylor expansion to natural exponential in
(179)
e
fMt  eNt eSt ' efM  eN eS + efM  eN eS fMt   fM  efM  eN eS  eNt   eN  efM  eN eS eSt   eS
e
fMt  eNt eSt ' 1 + fMt   eNt   eSt (180)
where fM = eN = eS = 0 was used. Inserting (180) into (179) and simplifying results in
eSt = fMt   eNt (181)
Forward Exchange Rate Next, simplifying (176)
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Ft = St
Et

Ct+1
Ct
1 
Nt
Nt+1

Et

Ct+1
Ct
1 
Mt
Mt+1

Ft = St
Nt
Mt
Et

Mt+1
Nt+1

Ft =
(1  )

Et

Mt+1
Nt+1

(182)
where (171) was used. Applying Uhligs method to (182) and rst order taylor expansion
results in
Ft =
(1  )

Et

Mt+1
Nt+1

Fe
eFt = (1  )

Et
"
Me
fMt+1
Ne eNt+1
#
1 = eEt[
fMt+1] Et[ eNt+1] eFt
eFt = Et hfMt+1i  Et h eNt+1i (183)
where (177) and (178) were used. Thus (181) and (183) are expressed in terms of log-
linearlized exogenous stochastic state variables.
Approximating Stochastic Processes Finally, the log-linearlized counterparts to
(109)  (112) are
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gxt+1 = 1 ext + "xt+1 (184)gyt+1 = 2eyt + "yt+1 (185)
]Mt+1 = 3fMt + "Mt+1 (186)
]Nt+1 = 4fNt + "Nt+1 (187)
System (184)  (187) can be converted into linear algebra
Xt+1 = AXt + C"t+1 (188)
where
Xt =
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
fNt
37777777777777777775
; "t+1 =
26666666666666666664
"xt+1
"yt+1
"Mt+1
"Nt+1
37777777777777777775
A =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 3 0
0 0 0 4
37777777777777777775
; C =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
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20.2.2 Minimizing Player Chooses Second
The malevolent nature assumes the maximizing player is both optimizing and in equilibrium
so that perfect risk sharking equilibrium, (142) (145); (171) (175) all hold, and (96) (97)
bind so that the minimizing players problem is presented as
min
fwt+1g1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
(

"
 (c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + w
2
t+1
#
+ (1  )
"
 (c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + 
w2t+1
#)
s:t: xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + wt+1 + "xt+1
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + wt+1 + "yt+1
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + wt+1 + "Mt+1
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + wt+1 + "Nt+1
(105)  (108), (159)  (162), aswell as aforementioned conditions complete specication
of minimizing players problem.
Lemma 1 Home and Foreign have homogenous pessimism so that  = 
The resulting minimization problem with homogenous pessimism is
min
fwt+1g1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
(
 
"

(cxtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + (1  )
(c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1  
#
+ w2t+1
)
s:t: xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + wt+1 + "xt+1
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + wt+1 + "yt+1
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + wt+1 + "Mt+1
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + wt+1 + "Nt+1
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where  = +(1 ) , in other words world pessimism  is an implicit weighted average
of  and  so since  =  and  = 1
2
;  becomes a parameter used by both Home and Foreign
as a concern for model misspecication.To solve the minization problem, Linear-Quadratic
Approximation Control is used
Steady-State The steady-states needed for log-linearlization of minimizing player problem
involve (142)  (145); (155)  (158); and (169)  (170). Initially, eliminating time subscripts
and turning o¤ both perturbation and error terms of (155)  (158) yields
x = (1  1) + 1x
y = (1  2) + 2y
M = (1  3) + 3M
N = (1  4) + 4N
simplifying results in
x = 1 (189)
y = 1 (190)
M = 1 (191)
N = 1 (192)
where (189) (192) are steady-state versions of their time-varying stochastic counterparts.
Next, eliminating time subscripts from (142)   (145) and inserting (189)   (190) where
appropriate results in
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cx =
1
2
(193)
cy =
1
2
(194)
cx =
1
2
(195)
cy =
1
2
(196)
where (193) (196) are steady-state versions of their time-varying stochastic counterparts.
Finally, following similar steps for (169)  (170) and using (189)  (192) results in
P = 1 (197)
P  = 1 (198)
where (197)  (198) represent steady-state home price and foreign price respectively.
Log-Linearlization To properly use LQA-Control techniques, the minimizing agents prob-
lem must be transfored using log-linearlization techniques .
Minimizing Agents Weighted Average Component Beginning with (94) and us-
ing Uhligs Method
89
(cxtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   =
h
cxe
fcxtc(1 )y e(1 )fcyti1 
1  
=

cxc
(1 )
y
(1 )
e(1 )(fcxt+(1 )fcyt)
1   (199)
Performing a second order taylor expansion (Kim and Kim 2007) on the natural expo-
nential component of (199)
e(1 )(fcxt+(1 )fcyt) ' e(1 )( ecx+(1 ) ecy) + e(1 )( ecx+(1 ) ecy) (1  )  (fcxt   ecx)
+ e(1 )( ecx+(1 ) ecy) (1  ) (1  ) (fcyt   ecy)
+
1
2

e(1 )( ecx+(1 ) ecy) (1  )2 2 (fcxt   ecx)2
+2e(1 )( ecx+(1 ) ecy) (1  )2 (1  )  (fcxt   ecx) (fcyt   ecy)
+e(1 )( ecx+(1 ) ecy) (1  )2 (1  )2 (fcyt   ecy)2 (200)
Inserting ecx = ecy = 0 into (200) and simplifying results in
e(1 )(fcxt+(1 )fcyt) ' 1 + (1  ) fcxt + (1  ) (1  )fcyt + 1
2

(1  )2 2fcxt2
+2 (1  )2 (1  ) fcxtfcyt + (1  )2 (1  )2 fcyt2 (201)
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Inserting ecxtfcyt = 0 into (201) for the cross-product term
e(1 )(fcxt+(1 )fcyt) ' 1 + (1  ) fcxt + (1  ) (1  )fcyt + 1
2

(1  )2 2fcxt2
+ (1  )2 (1  )2 fcyt2 (202)
)
(cxtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   '

cxc
(1 )
y
(1 )
1   +

cxc
(1 )
y
(1 )
[fcxt + (1  )fcyt
+
1
2
 
(1  ) 2fcxt2 + (1  ) (1  )2 fcyt2 (203)
where (202) is inserted into (199) for the natural exponential term, and simplied result-
ing in (203): The constant term implies that (203) is expressed in terms of levels but the
expression must be in terms of log-deviations so subtract the constant term from both sides
to yield
eUH ' cxc(1 )y (1 ) fcxt + (1  )fcyt + 12  (1  ) 2fcxt2 + (1  ) (1  )2 fcyt2

(204)
where eUH = (cxtc1 yt )1 1   

cxc
(1 )
y
(1 )
1  . Analogously for Foreign,
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eUF ' cx c(1 )y (1 ) fcxt + (1  )fcyt + 12 (1  ) 2fcxt2 + (1  ) (1  )2 fcyt2

(205)
where eUF = (cxtc1 yt )1 1   

cx c
(1 )
y
(1 )
1  :
The minimizing players objective function contains a weighted average component of
(94) and (95) or

(cxtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   + (1  )
(c

xtc
1 
yt )
1 
1   (206)
Inserting (204) for (94) and (205) for (95) in (206)
fUH + (1  ) fUF (207)
Setting  = 1
2
, expanding, and simplifying (207)



fcxt + fcxt+ (1  )fcyt + fcyt+ 12 (1  ) 2 fc2xt + fc2xt+ 12 (1  ) (1  )2 fc2yt + fc2yt

(208)
where  =

cxc
(1 )
y
(1 )
2
and (208) ultimately is the log-linearlized (in terms of deviations
froms steady-state) form of (206): Now in order to express (208) in terms of exogenous
variables xt; yt;Mt; and Nt the remainder of minimizing players specication is used namely
(105)  (108); and (159)  (162). Log-linearlize (105) using Uhligs method and second-order
taylor approximation,
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cxt + c

xt = xt
cxe
fcxt + cxefcxt = xe ext
cx

1 + fcxt + 1
2
fcxt2+ cx1 + fcxt + 12fcxt2

= x

1 + ext + 1
2
ext2
cx + cxfcxt + cx
2
fcxt2 + cx + cxfcxt + cx2 fcxt2 = x+ xext + x2 ext2
cxfcxt + +cxfcxt = xext + x2 ext2   cx2 fcxt2   cx2 fcxt2fcxt + fcxt = x
cx
ext + x
2cx
ext2   1
2
fcxt2   1
2
fcxt2
fcxt + fcxt = x
cx
ext + x
2cx
ext2   1
2
fcxt2 + fcxt2 (209)
where cx = cx is used. Following a similar procedure for (106) results in
fcyt + fcyt = y
cy
eyt + y
2cy
eyt2   1
2
fcyt2 + fcyt2 (210)
where cy = cy is used. Plug (209) and (210) into (208) for linear consumptions




x
cx
ext + x
2cx
ext2  
2
fcxt2 + fcxt2+ (1  ) ycy eyt + y2cy eyt2

  (1  )
2
fcyt2 + fcyt2
+
1
2
(1  ) 2
fc2xt + fc2xt+ 12 (1  ) (1  )2 fc2yt + fc2yt

further simplication yields
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


x
cx
ext + x
2cx
ext2+ (1  ) y
cy
eyt + y
2cy
eyt2+ 1
2
(1  ) 2   
2
fc2xt + fc2xt
+

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
fc2yt + fc2yt (211)
Next, combining (107)  (108) with (159)  (162), log-linearlizing using Uhligs method
with second-order taylor expansion so that a similar process to (209) and (210) is followed
results in
fc2xt + fc2xt = 2M
Pcx
fMt + M
Pcx
gM2t   2fcxt + fcxt (212)
and analogously,
fc2yt + fc2yt = 2N
P cy
fNt + N
P cy
fN2t   2fcyt + fcyt (213)
Inserting (212) and (213) into (211) for quadratic consumption terms yields




x
cx
ext + x
2cx
ext2+ (1  ) y
cy
eyt + y
2cy
eyt2
+

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2

2M
Pcx
fMt + M
Pcx
gM2t   2fcxt + fcxt
+

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2

2N
P cy
fNt + N
P cy
fN2t   2fcyt + fcyt (214)
Since the minimizing player assumes the maximizing player is in equilibrium, use log-
linear versions of (142)  (145) or
94
fcxt = ext
2fcyt = eyt
2
(215)
fcxt = ext2 (216)fcyt = eyt2 (217)
Insert (215)   (217) into (214) for remaining linear consumption terms and expanding
results in


x
cx
ext + x
2cx
ext2 + (1  ) y
cy
eyt + (1  ) y
2cy
eyt2
+
2M
Pcx

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2
 fMt + M
Pcx

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2
gM2t   212 (1  ) 2   2
 ext
+
2N
P cy

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
fNt + N
P cy

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
 fN2t
 2

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
 eyt (218)
consolidating linear and quadratic terms in (218)
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
x
cx
  2

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2
 ext + (1  ) y
cy
  2

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
 eyt
+
2M
Pcx

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2
 fMt + 2N
P cy

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
fNt
+
x
2cx
ext2 + (1  ) y
2cy
eyt2 + M
Pcx

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2
gM2t + N
P cy

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
 fN2t 
(219)
For small deviations in each state variable, the linear terms in (219) can be ignored
(Levine and Pearlman 2006) yielding


x
2cx
ext2 + (1  ) y
2cy
eyt2 + M
Pcx

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2
gM2t + N
P cy

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2
 fN2t 
(220)
Distributing  and redening each coe¢ cient where
r1 = 
x
2cx
r2 = 
(1  ) y
2cy
r3 = 
M
Pcx

1
2
(1  ) 2   
2

r4 = 
N
P cy

1
2
(1  ) (1  )2   (1  )
2

(220) is reduced to
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r1 ext2 + r2eyt2 + r3gM2t + r4fN2t (221)
(221) expresses the weighted average component of minizing agents objective fuction as
a quadratic in terms exogenous state variables.
Perturbed Stochastic Processes The log-linearlization of (155)  (158) yields
gxt+1 = 1 ext + wt+1 + "xt+1 (222)gyt+1 = 2eyt + wt+1 + "yt+1 (223)
]Mt+1 = 3fMt + wt+1 + "Mt+1 (224)
]Nt+1 = 4fNt + wt+1 + "Nt+1 (225)
Replacing the weighted average component of minimizing players problem with (221)
and using (222)  (225) as constraints instead, the malevolent natures problem becomes
min
fwt+1g1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
n
 

r1 ext2 + r2eyt2 + r3gM2t + r4fN2t + w2t+1o
s:t: gxt+1 = 1 ext + wt+1 + "xt+1gyt+1 = 2eyt + wt+1 + "yt+1
]Mt+1 = 3fMt + wt+1 + "Mt+1
]Nt+1 = 4fNt + wt+1 + "Nt+1
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Linear Quadratic Approximation Control To cast in LQA framework, transform the
above minimization problem in terms of matrix algebra
min
fwt+1g1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
fNt
37777777777777777775
0 26666666666666666664
r1 0 0 0
0 r2 0 0
0 0 r3 0
0 0 0 r4
37777777777777777775
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
fNt
37777777777777777775
+ I4w
0
t+1wt+1
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
s:t:
26666666666666666664
gxt+1
gyt+1
]Mt+1
]Nt+1
37777777777777777775
=
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 3 0
0 0 0 4
37777777777777777775
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
fNt
37777777777777777775
+
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
wt+1+
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
26666666666666666664
"xt+1
"yt+1
"Mt+1
"Nt+1
37777777777777777775
or
min
fwt+1g1t=0
Et
1X
t=0
t
n
 X 0tRXt + I4w
0
t+1wt+1
o
s:t: Xt+1 = AXt + Cwt+1 + C"t+1
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where
Xt =
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
fNt
37777777777777777775
; "t+1 =
26666666666666666664
"xt+1
"yt+1
"Mt+1
"Nt+1
37777777777777777775
; R =
26666666666666666664
r1 0 0 0
0 r2 0 0
0 0 r3 0
0 0 0 r4
37777777777777777775
;
A =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 3 0
0 0 0 4
37777777777777777775
; C =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
; and I4 =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
where the minimizing players LQA-C problem is expressed in terms of exogenous state
variables (i.e. excludes maximizing players control variables), which is natural to purely ex-
ogenous endowment economies, and malevolent natures control variable wt+1:The problem
can be translated into a Bellman equation,
 X 0tPXt   p = min
wt+1
n
 X 0tRXt + I4w
0
t+1wt+1 + Et

 X 0t+1PXt+1   p
o
s:t: Xt+1 = AXt + Cwt+1 + C"t+1
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where V (Xt) =  X 0tPXt p is a specic quadratic structure of the value function and the
symmetric matrix P is a xed point used to nd a stable solution that minimizes malevolent
natures problem . Using certainty equivalence, all uncertainty in the problem is eliminated
so that "t+1 = 0 which in turn eliminates p,
 X 0tPXt = min
wt+1
n
 X 0tRXt + I4w
0
t+1wt+1 + 

 X 0t+1PXt+1
o
s:t: Xt+1 = AXt + Cwt+1
Inserting state-evolution constraint into the objective function yields the unconstrained
minimization problem,
 X 0tPXt = min
wt+1
n
 X 0tRXt + I4w
0
t+1wt+1 + 
h
  (AXt + Cwt+1)
0
P (AXt + Cwt+1)
io
@V
@wt+1
= 0 : 2I4wt+1   2C 0PAXt   2C 0PCwt+1 = 0 (226)
@V
@Xt
= 0 :  2RXt   2A0PAXt   2A0PCwt+1 = 0 (227)
Beginning with (226),
2I4wt+1   2C 0PAXt   2C 0PCwt+1 = 0
I4wt+1   C 0PAXt   C 0PCwt+1 = 0
wt+1 =

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PAXt
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wt+1 = KXt (228)
where K =

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PA. (228) represents movement of malevolent natures
perturbation wt+1 as a function of the state vector Xt. Next, utilizing (227) and inserting
(228) for expanded K,
 2RXt   2A0PAXt   2A0PC

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PAXt = 0
R + A0PA+ A0PC

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PA = 0
P = R + A0PA+ A0PC

I4   C 0PC
 1
C 0PA (229)
(229) represents the Riccati equation whose properites are well-known in linear-quadratic
control theory. The xed-point matrix P is used to nd a stable solution so that (229)
becomes
Pk+1 = R + A
0PkA+ A0PkC

I4   C 0PkC
 1
C 0PkA (230)
Setting P0 = 0 as an initial condition and iterating (230) until convergence yields
bP = R + A0 bPA+ A0 bPC I4   C 0 bPC 1C 0 bPA (231)
where bP is a steady-state xed point that when inserted into (228) for expanded K;
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wt+1 =

I4   C 0 bPC 1C 0 bPAXt (232)
wt+1 = K( bP )Xt (233)
where K( bP ) = I4   C 0 bPC 1C 0 bPA and (233) is malevolent natures perturbation
encoded with xed-point matrix bP .
(233) feeds back into the perturbed state-evolution system
Xt+1 = AXt + Cwt+1 + C"t+1
Xt+1 = AXt + CKXt + C"t+1
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1 (234)
where A0 = (A+ CK) :Ultimately, (234) is the perturbed state-evolution system embed-
ded with malevolent natures feedback rule wt+1:
20.3 Spot & Forward Exchange Rates
Generating inference involves (181); (183); and (234) but recall that both (181) and (183)
are in terms of two exogenous state variables and (234) is in terms of four exogenous state
variables. To remedy the issue, convert (181) into linear-algebra form
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eSt = fMt   eNt
eSt =
24
1  1
35
26666664
fMt
eNt
37777775
eSt =
24
1  1
35
26666664
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777775
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
eNt
37777777777777777775
eSt =
24
1  1
35UsXt
eSt = Xt (235)
where  =
24
1  1
35Us and Us =
26666664
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777775 is known as a selection matrix that
creates dependence between eSt and fMt; eNt:
Next, insert (186) and (187) into (183) ,distribute expectation operator, and convert into
linear algebra
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eFt = Et hfMt+1i  Et h eNt+1ieFt = 3fMt   4fNt
eFt =
24
3  4
35
26666664
fMt
eNt
37777775
eFt =
24
3  4
35
26666664
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777775
26666666666666666664
ext
eyt
fMt
eNt
37777777777777777775
eFt =
24
3  4
35UsXt
eFt =  Xt (236)
where   =
24
3  4
35Us and Us is dened as above.
20.4 Gross Rate of Depreciation & Forward Premium
The Gross Rate of Depreciation can be constructed using (235) and a lead of (235) or
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eSt+1   eSt (237)
where eSt+1 is ex-post.
and the Forward Premium can be constructed using both (235) and (236)
eFt   eSt (238)
Again, the motivator for dynamics of (235)  (238) is perturbed stochastic system
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1 (239)
21 Detection Error Probabilities
To discipline the choice of ; detection error probability method is enforced so state the
approximating state-evolution system (188)
Xt+1 = AXt + Cd"t+1 (240)
which will be known as "Model A." State the perturbed state-evolution system (234)
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1 (241)
which will be known as "Model B."
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21.1 Log-Likelihood Ratio Test with Model A
Assume the worst-case shock is generated under Model A,
wAt+1 = KX
A
t+1 (242)
Dene Model A innovations,
Xt+1 = AXt + Cd"t+1 (243)
Cd"t+1 = Xt+1   AXt (244)d"t+1 = (C 0C) 1C 0 (Xt+1   AXt) (245)
Dene Model B innovations,
Xt+1 = A
0Xt + C"t+1 (246)
C"t+1 = Xt+1   A0Xt (247)
"t+1 = (C
0C) 1C 0
 
Xt+1   A0Xt

(248)
"t+1 = (C
0C) 1C 0 (Xt+1   AXt)  (C 0C) 1C 0CKXt (249)
"t+1 = d"t+1   wt+1 (250)
where A0 = (A+ CK) was used. Next, dene both
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Log LA =   1
T
T 1X
t=0

n log
p
2 +
1
2
 d"t+10d"t+1 (251)
Log LB =   1
T
T 1X
t=0

n log
p
2 +
1
2
 
"0t+1"t+1

(252)
where (251) is generated under innovations from (245) and (252) is generated under
innovations from (250): To construct log-likelihood ratio test w.r.t Model A dene,
rjA = Log LA   Log LB
=   1
T
T 1X
t=0

n log
p
2 +
1
2
 d"t+10d"t+1+ 1
T
T 1X
t=0

n log
p
2 +
1
2
 
"0t+1"t+1

=
1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
 
"0t+1"t+1
  1
2
 d"t+10d"t+1
=
1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
 d"t+1   wAt+10  d"t+1   wAt+1  12  d"t+10d"t+1

=
1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
 d"t+10d"t+1  d"t+10wAt+1   wA0t+1d"t+1 + wA0t+1wAt+1  12  d"t+10d"t+1

rjA = 1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
wA0t+1w
A
t+1  
1
2
wA0t+1d"t+1 (253)
The objective of this section is to give the probability associated with incorrectly choosing
Model B when the true data driving process is Model A or
pA = Pr (rjA < 0) (254)
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21.2 Log-Likelihood Ratio Test with Model B
Assume the worst-case shock is generated under Model B,
wBt+1 = KX
B
t+1 (255)
(251) and (252) can be used to construct the log-likelihood ratio test under Model B,
rjB =   1
T
T 1X
t=0

1
2
wB0t+1w
B
t+1 +
1
2
wB0t+1d"t+1 (256)
where (256) is produced under a similar process to (253) except that the worst-case shocks
are generated by (255): The objective of this section is to give the probability associated with
incorrectly choosing Model A when the true data driving process is Model B or
pB = Pr (rjB > 0) (257)
21.3 Probability of Detection Error
Using (254) and (257) yields the formula
p =
1
2
(pA + pB) (258)
where p is the probability of error in choosing the correct model which implies that 1  p
is the probability of success in choosing the correct model.
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Remark 5 There lies a positive relationship between p and 
Thus, as  decreases its associated p will decrease as well so that the desired level of
detection error will implicitly discipline the value of :
21.4 Probability of Detection Error Estimation
The following steps denote detection error probability estimation:
For pA
Step 1) Set prior about  and generate fd"t+1gTt=0 from b"t~N (04; I4) for data observations
of length T where 04 is a 4x4 matrix of zeros and I4 is 4x4 identity matrix.
Step 2) Use pseudo fd"t+1gTt=0 to iterate on (240) resulting in XAt 	Tt=0
Step 3) Use

XAt
	T
t=0
to iterate on (242) resulting in

wAt+1
	T
t=0
Step 4) Insert pseudo-generated fd"t+1gTt=0 and wAt+1	Tt=0 into (253) and sum
Step 5) Simulate (Repeat steps 1-4) for large sample size
Step 6) Count number of times rjA < 0 from simulation and average by number of times
simulated: The result is pA
For pB
Step 1) Using same prior  generate f"t+1gTt=0 from "t~N (04; I4) for data observations of
length T where 04 is a 4x4 matrix of zeros and I4 is 4x4 identity matrix.
Step 2) Use pseudo f"t+1gTt=0 to iterate on (241) resulting in

XBt
	T
t=0
Step 3) Use

XBt
	T
t=0
to iterate on (255) resulting in

wBt+1
	T
t=0
Step 4) Insert pseudo-generated f"t+1gTt=0 and

wBt+1
	T
t=0
into (256) and sum
Step 5) Simulate (Repeat steps 1-4) for large sample size
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Step 6) Count number of times rjB > 0 from simulation and average by number of times
simulated: The result is pB
Once pA and pB are obtained insert into (258) to obtain p: When estimating p using the
above process, begin with prior about  and drive down  until desired level of p is achieved.
Reaching this desired level of p in turn disciplines the choice of :
22 Forward Premium Puzzle
22.1 Downward Bias of Estimator
To derive the downward bias of the forward premium estimator, we begin by using an OLS
regression of (237) on to (238) so that,
eSt+1 eSt = c0 +c1  eFt eSt+ t+1 (259)
where et+1  N (0; 2) : Inserting (235) and (236) into (259) results in,
Xt+1   Xt = c0 +c1  eFt   eSt+ t+1
A0Xt + Ct+1   Xt = c0 +c1  eFt   eSt+ t+1
 (A  I)Xt + Ct+1 = c0 +c1 (   )Xt + t+1
Next, expand each matrix and vector by the number of observations from t = 1; :::; T so
that,
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26666666666664
 (A  I)    0
...
. . .
...
0     (A  I)
37777777777775
| {z }
Q
26666666666664
X1
...
XT
37777777777775
+
26666666666664
C    0
...
. . .
...
0    C
37777777777775
| {z }
R
26666666666664
2
...
T+1
37777777777775
=
c0 +c1
zz }| {26666666666664
(   )    0
...
. . .
...
0    (   )
37777777777775
| {z }
V
26666666666664
X1
...
XT
37777777777775
+
26666666666664
2
...
T+1
37777777777775
QX +R| {z }
Y
=
24
i z
35
| {z }
W
26666664
c0
c1
37777775
| {z }b
+ 
Where subscripts have been eliminated from X and  which imply current time-period.
Utilizing ordinary least squares optimal slope estimator formula,
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b = (W 0W ) 1W 0Y
b =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
i0
z0
37777775
24
i z
35
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
 1 26666664
i0
z0
37777775 (QX +R)
b =
26666664
i0i i0z
z0i z0z
37777775
 1 26666664
i0
z0
37777775 (QX +R)
b =
26666664
i0i i0z
z0i z0z
37777775
 1 26666664
i0QX + i0R
z0QX + z0R
37777775 (260)
To rid the X term on the RHS of (260); exploit equation (241) where if t = 0,
X1 = A
0X0 + C1 (261)
X1   A0X0 = C1
X1 = C1 (262)
where its assumed X0 = 0 in (262): "Pushing" (261) forward in time results in,
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X2 = A
0X1 + C2
X2   A0X1 = C2
continuing in this manner results from t = 1; :::; T results in a system of equations,
X1 = C1
X2   A0X1 = C2
X3   A0X2 = C3
...
XT   A0XT 1 = CT
converting to matrix form,
26666666666666666666666664
I 0 0    0
 A0 I 0 . . . ...
0  A0 I . . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0    0  A0 I
37777777777777777777777775
26666666666666666666666664
X1
X2
X3
...
XT
37777777777777777777777775
=
26666666666666666666666664
C 0 0    0
0 C 0
. . .
...
0 0 C
. . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0    0 0 C
37777777777777777777777775
26666666666666666666666664
1
2
3
...
T
37777777777777777777777775
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26666666666666666666666664
X1
X2
X3
...
XT
37777777777777777777777775
=
26666666666666666666666664
I 0 0    0
 A0 I 0 . . . ...
0  A0 I . . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0    0  A0 I
37777777777777777777777775
 1 26666666666666666666666664
C 0 0    0
0 C 0
. . .
...
0 0 C
. . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0    0 0 C
37777777777777777777777775
| {z }
	
26666666666666666666666664
1
2
3
...
T
37777777777777777777777775
| {z }
 1
or,
X = 	 1 (263)
Inserting (263) into (260) results in,
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b =
26666664
i0i i0z
z0i z0z
37777775
 1 26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
z0Q	 1 + z0R
37777775
b =
26666664
i0i i0z
z0i z0z
37777775
 1 26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
(V X)0Q	 1 + (V X)
0R
37777775
b =
26666664
i0i i0z
z0i z0z
37777775
 1 26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
(V	 1)
0Q	 1 + (V	 1)
0R
37777775
b =
26666664
i0i i0z
z0i z0z
37777775
 1 26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R
37777775
b =
26666664
i0i i0z
z0i z0z
37777775
 1 26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R
37777775
b = 1
(i0i) (z0z)  (i0z) (z0i)
26666664
z0z  i0z
 z0i i0i
37777775
26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R
37777775
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b = 1
T

(V X)0 V X
  (i0V X) (V X)0 i
26666664
(V X)0 V X  i0V X
  (V X)0 i i0i
37777775
26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R
37777775
b = 1
TX 0V 0V X   i0V XX 0V 0i
26666664
X 0V 0V X  i0V X
 X 0V 0i i0i
37777775
26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R
37777775
Thus,
b = 1
T0 1	0V 0V	 1   i0V	 10 1	0V 0i
26666664
0 1	
0V 0V	 1  i0V	 1
 0 1	0V 0i T
37777775
26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R
37777775
(264)
where extensive use of z = V X and X = 	 1 was made. Taking the probability limit
of (264) results in,
p lim
b = E fg
where the  inside the brackets represents RHS terms of (264) :Distributing the expecta-
tions term,
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p lim
b = 
E
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
0 1	
0V 0V	 1  i0V	 1
 0 1	0V 0i T
37777775
26666664
i0Q	 1 + i0R
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R
37777775
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
where
 = 1=

Ttr(	0V 0V	)2 + m0 1	
0V 0V	m 1   tr (i0V		0V 0i)2 + i0V	m 1m0 1	0V 0i

:
Further consolidation yields,
p lim
b = 
E
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
0 1	
0V 0V	 1 (i0Q	 1 + i0R)  i0V	 1
 
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R

 0 1	0V 0i (i0Q	 1 + i0R) + T
 
0 1	
0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	
0V 0R

37777775
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
where 
 = 1=2 [Ttr(	0V 0V	)  tr (i0V		0V 0i)] :Distributing E operator through the
matrix results in,
p lim
b = 

26666664
0
E
 0 1	0V 0i (i0Q	 1 + i0R) + T  0 1	0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	0V 0R	
37777775
where further simplication nally results in,
p lim (1) =
E
 0 1	0V 0i (i0Q	 1 + i0R) + T  0 1	0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	0V 0R	
Ttr(	0V 0V	)2   tr (i0V		0V 0i)2 (265)
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where the superscript m in m
0
 1 denotes the mean of 
0
 1 so that 
m0
 1 = 0. Additionally,
manipulations using E( 1) = E() = E( 10) = 0 aided in eliminating c0 from the b
vector. Further simplication of (265) results in,
p lim
c1 = E  0 1	0V 0ii0Q	 1   0 1	0V 0ii0R+ T  0 1	0V 0Q	 1 + 0 1	0V 0R	2 [Ttr(	0V 0V	)  tr (i0V		0V 0i)]
p lim
c1 = 2 [ tr (	0V 0ii0Q	) + Ttr (	0V 0Q	)]2 [Ttr(	0V 0V	)  tr (i0V		0V 0i)]
p lim
c1 = tr [T	0V 0Q	 	0V 0ii0Q	]tr [T	0V 0V	  i0V		0V 0i]
p lim
c1 = tr [T	0V 0Q	 	0V 0ii0Q	]tr [T	0V 0V	 	0V 0ii0V	]
p lim
c1 = tr [	0V 0 (TI   ii0)Q	]tr [	0V 0 (TI   ii0)V	]
p lim (1) =
Ttr

	0V 0
 
I   ii0
T

Q	

Ttr

	0V 0
 
I   ii0
T

V	

p lim
c1 = tr (	0V 0MiQ	)tr (	0V 0MiV	)
p lim
c1 = 1  1 + tr (	0V 0MiQ	)tr (	0V 0MiV	)
p lim
c1 = 1  1 + tr (	0V 0MiQ	)tr (	0V 0MiV	)
p lim
c1 = 1  tr (	0V 0MiV	)  tr (	0V 0MiQ	)tr (	0V 0MiV	)

) p lim
c1 = 1  tr [	0V 0Mi (V  Q) 	]tr (	0V 0MiV	) (266)
22.2 Consistency of Estimator
To show consistency of the slope estimator, take the limit of  !1 to p lim
c1 or,
lim
!1
n
p lim
c1o = lim
!1

1  tr [	
0V 0Mi (V  Q) 	]
tr (	0V 0MiV	)

(267)
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Focusing on the (V  Q) matrix,
(V  Q) =
26666666666664
(   )    0
...
. . .
...
0    (   )
37777777777775
 
26666666666664
 (A0   I)    0
...
. . .
...
0     (A0   I)
37777777777775
(V  Q) =
26666666666664
   A0    0
...
. . .
...
0       A0
37777777777775
lim
!1
(V  Q) =
26666666666664
lim
!1
f   A0g    0
...
. . .
...
0    lim
!1
f   A0g
37777777777775
lim
!1
(V  Q) =
26666666666664
   A    0
...
. . .
...
0       A
37777777777775
(268)
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where we recall thatA0 = A+ C
h
I4x4   C 0PC
i 1
C 0PA andC
h
I4x4   C 0PC
i 1
C 0PA!
0 as  ! 1: Now, to show that (268) is essentially a null matrix, we show that   = A
where recall,
  =
24
3  4
35
26666664
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777775
  =
24
0 0 3  4
35
and
A =
24
1  1
35
26666664
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777775
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 3 0
0 0 0 4
37777777777777777775
A =
24
0 0 3  4
35
Implementing this null matrix back in (267) eliminates the bias term reducing (267) to
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lim
!1
fp lim (1)g = 1 (269)
Hence an unbiased slope estimator.
22.3 Estimation
Step 1) Generate sequence of pseudo errors f"tgTt=1 where "t  N (04; I4) and T is equivalent
to length of observational data
Step 2) Insert generated f"tgTt=1 into (239) and iterate to generate fXtgTt=1
Step 3) Insert fXtgTt=1 into (235) and (236) to generate
neStoT
t=1
and
n eFtoT
t=1
respectively
Step 4) Construct
neSt+1   eStoT 1
t=1
=
neSt+1oT 1
t=1
 
neStoT 1
t=1
and
n eFt   eStoT 1
t=1
=
n eFtoT 1
t=1
 neStoT 1
t=1
Step 5) Convert into vector so that
St+1 St =
26666666666664
eS2   eS1
...
eST   eST 1
37777777777775
Ft St =
26666666666664
eF1   eS1
...
eFT 1   eST 1
37777777777775
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From Step 5, utilize vectors and perform the following regression
St+1 St = c0 +c1 (Ft St) + et+1 (270)
where (273) uses standard ordinary least squares. If Ft St and St+1 St are temporarily
dened as X and Y respectively then the estimators c0 and c1 are
c1 = (X0X) 1 (X0Y) (271)c0 = Y  c1X (272)
where X and Y represent the mean of X and Y respectively.  which correspond to
detection error probabilities of p() = 0:100 and p() = 0:000 can be inserted within Step 2)
in order to yield c1 > 0 and c1 < 0 respectively.
22.4 Simulation
Parameter Values Model parameters used for simulation are,
 = 0:99
 = 10
 = 0:5
 = 0:5
Step 1) Generate sequence of pseudo errors f"tgTt=1 where "t  N (04; I4) and T is equivalent
to length of observational data
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Step 2) Insert generated f"tgTt=1 into (239) and iterate to generate fXtgTt=1
Step 3) Insert fXtgTt=1 into (235) and (236) to generate
neStoT
t=1
and
n eFtoT
t=1
respectively
Step 4) Construct
neSt+1   eStoT 1
t=1
=
neSt+1oT 1
t=1
 
neStoT 1
t=1
and
n eFt   eStoT 1
t=1
=
n eFtoT 1
t=1
 neStoT 1
t=1
Step 5) Convert into vector so that
St+1 St =
26666666666664
eS2   eS1
...
eST   eST 1
37777777777775
Ft St =
26666666666664
eF1   eS1
...
eFT 1   eST 1
37777777777775
From Step 5, utilize vectors and perform the following regression
St+1 St = c0 +c1 (Ft St) + et+1 (273)
where (273) uses standard ordinary least squares. If Ft St and St+1 St are temporarily
dened as X and Y respectively then the estimators c0 and c1 are
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c1 = (X0X) 1 (X0Y) (274)c0 = Y  c1X (275)
where X and Y represent the mean of X and Y respectively. Repeat Step 1)-Step
5) for large simulation size N where the simulation size is conducted under a specic 
corresponding to detection error probability p(). This will generate N number of c1 under
a specic  regime, ultimately yielding desired PDF.
23 Data
23.1 Description
1. Home Output: Dened as
xDt =
26666666666664
x1986:III
...
x2013:III
37777777777775
(276)
where xDt represents a time-series data vector containing aggregate U.S. real G.D.P ob-
servations in millions of chained 2009 dollars ( from Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis) and
quarterly frequency from 3rd quarter of 1986 to 3rd quarter of 2013.
2. Foreign Output: This variable is constructed using
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yDt =
ynt
pt
(277)
where yt represents U.K. real G.D.P constructed from ynt which is aggregate U.K. nominal
G.D.P observations in millions of pounds (from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) and pt
which is U.K. C.P.I (with 2010=100 and from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). Using
(277) the following can be formed
yDt =
26666666666664
y1986:III
...
y2013:III
37777777777775
(278)
where yDt represents a time-series data vector containing constructed aggregate U.K. real
G.D.P observations in quarterly frequency from 3rd quarter of 1986 to 3rd quarter of 2013.
3. Home Money: Dened as
MDt =
26666666666664
M1986:III
...
M2013:III
37777777777775
(279)
where MDt is a time-series data vector containing aggregate U.S. Household Financial
Assets and Currency observations ( from Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis) in quarterly
frequency from 3rd quarter of 1986 to 3rd quarter of 2013.
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4. Foreign Money: Dened as
NDt =
26666666666664
N1986:III
...
N2013:III
37777777777775
(280)
where Nt is a time-series data vector containing aggregate U.K. Household Outstanding
Holdings of Notes/Coin observations in millions of pounds ( from Bank of England) and
quarterly frequency from 3rd quarter of 1986 to 3rd quarter of 2013.
5. Spot Exchange Rate: Dened as
SDt =
26666666666664
S1986:III
...
S2013:III
37777777777775
(281)
where SDt is a time-series data vector containing $=$ spot exchange rate observations
(from Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis) in quarterly frequency from 3rd quarter of 1986 to
3rd quarter of 2013.
6. Forward Exchange Rate: Dened as
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FDt =
26666666666664
F1986:III
...
F2013:III
37777777777775
(282)
where FDt is a time-series data vector containing $=$ 1-month forward exchange rate
observations (from Bank of England) in quarterly frequency from 3rd quarter of 1986 to 3rd
quarter of 2013.
23.2 Stochastic Processes Estimation with Data
In this papers model, the stochastic process are assumed to evolve according to (109) (112)
restated below for convenience
xt+1 = (1  1) + 1xt + "xt+1
yt+1 = (1  2) + 2yt + "yt+1
Mt+1 = (1  3) + 3Mt + "Mt+1
Nt+1 = (1  4) + 4Nt + "Nt+1
The following steps indicate how to process data:
Step 1) Take log of each element in (276); (278); (279); and (280) producing log(xDt ); log(y
D
t ); log(M
D
t );
and log(NDt ) respectively.
Step 2) HP-Filter each logged data vectors which separates trend and cyclical components
producing log(xDt )
C ; log(yDt )
C ; log(MDt )
C ; and log(NDt )
C where each superscript C de-
notes the logged cyclical component of the superscripts respective data vector.
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Step 3) Insert log(xDt )
C ; log(yDt )
C ; log(MDt )
C ; and log(NDt )
C in place of xt; yt;Mt; and Nt
respectively yielding
log(xDt+1)
C = (1  1) + 1 log(xDt )C + "xt+1 (283)
log(yDt+1)
C = (1  2) + 2 log(yDt )C + "yt+1 (284)
log(MDt+1)
C = (1  3) + 3 log(MDt )C + "Mt+1 (285)
log(NDt+1)
C = (1  4) + 4 log(NDt )C + "Nt+1 (286)
Step 4) Convert system (283)  (286) into VAR form
Xt+1 = C + SXt + "t+1 (287)
where
Xt =
26666666666666666664
log(xDt )
C
log(yDt )
C
log(MDt )
C
log(NDt )
C
37777777777777777775
; "t+1 =
26666666666666666664
"xt+1
"yt+1
"Mt+1
"Nt+1
37777777777777777775
; C =
26666666666666666664
(1  1)
(1  2)
(1  3)
(1  4)
37777777777777777775
; S =
26666666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 3 0
0 0 0 4
37777777777777777775
Step 5) Estimate (287) via ordinary least squares resulting in
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cS =
24 b1 b2 b3 b4
35 (288)
cC = (1 cS)X (289)
where the elements of (288) and (289) are used in place of their true counterparts in
system (109)  (112)
23.3 Forward Premium Regression with Data
Above, pseudo observations were generated for the regression of forward premium on gross
rate of depreciation so for comparison to data-driven regression, the following steps are
performed:
Step 1) Take the log of each element in (281)and (282) producing log(St) and log(Ft)
respectively
Step 2) Construct log(FDt )   log(SDt ) which is forward premium
Step 3) Construct log(SDt+1)  log(SDt ) which is gross rate of depreciation
Step 4) Dene Ft  St = log(FDt )   log(SDt ), St+1   St = log(SDt+1)  log(SDt ); and perform
the following regression via ordinary least squares
St+1 St = 0 + 1 (Ft St) + et+1 (290)
where c0 and c1 are estimators to 0 and 1 respectively.
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ABSTRACT
CAN ANIMAL SPIRITS SOLVE THE FORWARD PREMIUM PUZZLE?
by
ANTHONY P. SHKRELJA
December 2014
Advisor: Dr. Tatsuma Wada
Major: Economics (Macroeconomics)
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
This dissertation decomposes, discusses, and ventures to solve an international macroeco-
nomic anomaly known as the "Forward Premium Puzzle" into three main chapters. Chapter
1 explores the state of research pertaining to the Forward Premium Puzzle, which derives
from a failure in the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP). The body of literature is split into
three branches i. Those works advocating the presence of an anomaly due to assumption
of Rational Expectations, ii. Works preserving the assumption of Rational Expectations
and instead discuss a bias due to Risk Premia, and iii. Research focused on econometric
implementation of the forward premium estimator. Furthermore, a tour of Animal Spirits
is given and how applications out of control theory, or Robust Control, serves as a vehicle
of implementing Animal Spirits within modern macroeconomics as a potential resolution to
the anomaly.
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In Chapter 2, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) two-country two-money
model is tted with Robust Control, inducing fear of model misspecication, or pessimism, in
international households. The forward premium bias, produced from a collapse in uncovered
interest parity (UIP), is a direct function of pessimism. Under various regimes of pessimism,
the forward premium estimator emulates both features of international data and unbias UIP.
In Chapter 3 pessimism, via a parameter ; is implemented in a two-country, two-money
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model tted with robust control (RC). Using
detection error probability methodology, pessimism is calibrated using international data
and simulations from the RC-DSGE model. Data-driven pessimism and its simulation-based
counterpart are compared to determine how the animal spirit, produced from the model,
performs against pessimism implied by the data.
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